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The Authoritarianization of U.S.
Counterterrorism
Sahar F. Aziz*
[W]e will not hesitate to take decisive action. We will always do
so legally, discriminately, proportionally, and bound by strict
accountability and strong oversight. The United States—not
our adversaries—will define the nature and scope of this
struggle, lest it define us.1
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I. Introduction
More than seventeen years since the “War on Terror” began,
the United States has failed to recognize how its authoritarian
allies, rather than its adversaries, have defined its
counterterrorism practices. Western democracies have adopted
signature practices of authoritarian regimes.2 Torture, secret
renditions to black sites, indefinite detention, mass surveillance,
targeted killings, selective anti-terrorism enforcement against
dissidents and minorities, criminalization of political beliefs, and
decreased due process rights are among the counterterrorism
practices found in both the United States and their Middle East
allies, albeit in varying degrees.3
Human rights are de-coupled from security, or worse, treated
as an impediment to preserving national security. Although the
balance between security and liberty has been the topic of lively
2. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2004: HUMAN RIGHTS AND
ARMED CONFLICT 140–46 (2004) (discussing the threat to individual rights);
Jessica Wolfendale, Terrorism, Security, and the Threat of Counterterrorism, 29
STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 753, 761–62 (2016) (noting the tactics of military
dictatorships in South America who invoked the threat of internal and external
terrorism to justify torture and extrajudicial killings); Sudha Setty, Country
Report on Counterterrorism: United States of America, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 643, 644
(2015) (describing the sweeping executive power to investigate and neutralize
potential threats).
3. See ANTON DU PLESSIS, A SNAPSHOT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM SINCE 9/11 31–32 (Larissa van den Herrick &
Nico Schrijver eds., 2013) (describing the extraordinary rendition program);
SUSAN N. HERMAN, TAKING LIBERTIES: THE WAR OF TERROR AND THE EROSION OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 177 (2011) (noting targeting of Greenpeace by National
Security Agency surveillance); LALEH KHALILI, TIME IN THE SHADOWS:
CONFINEMENT IN COUNTERINSURGENCIES 58–64 (2013) (describing the rights
infringing tactics deployed by the Israeli government against Palestinians).
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debate since 9/11, I proffer that the impetus behind rights
violations is not limited to perennial tensions between security and
liberty in times of war. Increased international coordination in
counterterrorism between authoritarian regimes and liberal
democracies also adversely affects human rights.
As terrorism crosses borders with ease, transnational
counterterrorism has become a necessity.4 International
organizations and states coordinate preventing terrorism,
identifying and apprehending known terrorists, and prosecuting
terrorism suspects between nations.5 One consequence of such
coordination is the normalization of illiberal counterterrorism
norms and practices common among democratic nations.6
While coordinated counterterrorism is warranted to combat
transnational terrorists, the current rights-subordinating
approach is counterproductive.7 Western governments that engage
in or directly support rights-infringing practices ultimately aid
terrorists as they proclaim themselves legitimate defenders
against transnational state violence.8 Aggressive state measures
trigger backlash attacks as new grievances arise, thereby feeding
a cycle of state and non-state violence at the expense of civilian
lives.9 The challenge for Western democratic nations is to avoid a
4. See, e.g., Ayaz R. Shaikh, A Theoretic Approach to Transnational
Terrorism, 80 GEO. L.J. 2131, 2157 (1992) (“[T]ransnational terrorism, by
definition, involves the participation of more than one nation.”). But see TODD
SANDLER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM 2 (2008) (noting that Western nations’
view that transnational terrorism is a major threat is contradicted by the fact
that approximately 1,249 people are killed from transnational terrorist attacks in
comparison to 30,000 from annual highway accidents in the United States).
5. See Shaikh, supra note 4, at 2158–59 (stating the goals of international
cooperation). The role of non-state actors in transnational terrorism further
facilitates international cooperation. See Monika Heupel, Adapting to
Transnational Terrorism: The UN Security Council’s Evolving Approach to
Terrorism, 38 SECURITY DIALOGUE 477, 494–95 (2007) (emphasizing
contemporary terrorism’s fluid territorial affiliation).
6. See infra Part IV (detailing the impact of counterterrorism coordination).
7. See Wolfendale, supra note 2, at 760 (noting the inadvertent
consequences of Western counterterrorism).
8. See, e.g., DALIA DASSA KAYE ET AL., MORE FREEDOM, LESS TERROR?
LIBERALIZATION AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD 13 (2008) (stating
that United States support for authoritarian regimes unintentionally promoted
extremism).
9. See SANDLER ET AL, supra note 4, at 2 (describing competing
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race to the bottom in their counterterrorism coordination with
authoritarian regimes.
To be sure, the deplorable techniques used in the “War on
Terror” did not originate solely in the authoritarian regimes of the
Middle East and Central Asia.10 Such practices originated from
colonial powers in Algeria, Palestine, and Afghanistan, and were
subsequently adopted by new ruling elites post-independence.11
The United States innovated other practices, such as rendition and
targeted killings with drones.12 This Article, thus, explores the
narrow issue of the impact on democratic states’ conformity with
human rights arising from working with authoritarian states in
the Middle East. Specifically, I proffer that counterterrorism
coordination with dictatorships normalizes the use of violence and
dehumanization of suspects by the U.S. government.13 As more
agents work with foreign agents who operate in a legal and
political context where rights are subordinate to authoritarian
security practices, the toleration, aiding and abetting, or direct
violations of human rights may rise as the institutional culture of
an agency shifts towards a more authoritarian mentality.
The adverse consequences of this drift away from liberal
principles are not limited to the subordination of individual rights.
Security interests are also compromised. Terrorists astutely
exploit state violence and rights violations to legitimize their

considerations for liberal democracies responding to transnational terrorism).
10. See KHALILI, supra note 3, at 7–10 (showing the historical roots of the
post-9/11 detention and torture of terrorism suspect in the racialized
manipulation of law by European and American governments to repress colonized
people).
11. See id. at 7 (describing mass slaughter as a routine colonial warfare
technique).
12. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, When Are Drone Killings Illegal?, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/15/opinion/oconnell-targeted-killing/index.html
(last updated Aug. 16, 2012) (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (describing the
development of the drone program) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
13. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST MASS
SURVEILLANCE 39–45 (2005) (detailing the normalization of rendition, torture, and
death); HELEN DUFFY, THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ AND THE FRAMEWORK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 548–50 (2d ed. 2015) (critiquing international
counterterrorism coordination as marginalizing human rights).
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claims as defenders of justice against state oppression.14 Terrorist
recruiters point to the wide net of suspicion and prosecution cast
upon Muslim minorities as evidence of the state’s illegitimacy.15
Such trends are consistent with some scholars’ findings that
human rights abuses may correlate with terrorism.16
Prescriptively, I recommend that financial and legal
restrictions should be imposed on U.S. intelligence and security
agencies’ collaboration with authoritarian regimes with a track
record of rights violations in their counterterrorism practices.
Existing legal restrictions on the delivery of U.S. foreign aid to
countries that violate human rights should be expanded to
encompass
financial
support
and
coordination
in
counterterrorism.17 Put simply, U.S. security agencies should be
14. See, e.g., Sahar F. Aziz, Losing the ‘War of Ideas’: A Critique of
Countering Violent Extremism Programs, 52 TEX. INT’L L.J. 255, 261–62 (2017)
(arguing that narratives of oppression and injustice work to recruit vulnerable
individuals).
15. See, e.g., Wolfendale, supra note 2, at 763 (noting that the majority of
people arrested for terrorism in Britain are Muslim although the majority
actually convicted are non-Muslim). But see James A. Piazza & James Igoe Walsh,
Transnational Terror and Human Rights, 53 INT’L STUD. Q. 125, 129 (2009)
(challenging the normative claim that “transnational terrorist attacks lead
governments to restrict rights with the objective of improving security”).
16. See James I. Walsh & James A. Piazza, Why Respecting Physical
Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism, 43 COMP. POL. STUD. 551, 556 (2010) (arguing
that government violations of physical integrity promote terrorism). But see
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Jacob N. Shapiro, Tortured Relations: Human Rights
Abuses and Counterterrorism Cooperation, 43 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 415, 419 (2010)
(noting that further research is needed to determine if human rights restrictions
are counterproductive to international counterterrorism goals).
17. See NINA M. SERAFINO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43361, “LEAHY
LAW” HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE: ISSUE OVERVIEW 1
(2014)
Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 . . . prohibits the
furnishing of assistance authorized by the FAA and the Arms Export
Control Act . . . to any foreign security force unit that is credibly
believed to have committed a gross violation of human rights. The
other provision, inserted annually in DOD appropriations legislation,
for years prohibited the use of DOD funds to support any training
program (as defined by DOD) involving members of a unit of foreign
security or police force if the unit had committed a gross violation of
human rights. For FY2014, the prohibition has been expanded to also
include “equipment, or other assistance.”
See also Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortensen, United States Adjusts Aid
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restrained in the degree to which they can cooperate with countries
that violate human rights in counterterrorism.
This Article looks to the authoritarian practices of Egypt, one
of the United States’ major allies, as a case study. Having long
practiced torture, indefinite detention, trial of civilians in military
courts, and other human rights violations, Egypt was a
destination, among other nations, of terrorism suspects in the U.S.
extraordinary rendition program.18
In comparing the United States’ counterterrorism practices
with Egypt’s, the authoritarianization effect of coordination is
brought to the forefront. Specifically, American national security
policies and practices post-9/11 have become rights-infringing in
ways that mirror those of Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes,
and their predecessor colonial powers.19 Hawkish U.S. government
national security rhetoric and fear mongering translates into fewer
civil liberties and more human rights violations—first for Muslims
and eventually for the American public at large.20 Ranging from
the extreme practices of torture, indefinite detention, and targeted
assassinations to prosecutions that deny defendants’ due process,
habeas
corpus,
and
confrontation
rights,
America’s
counterterrorism practices in the “War on Terror” are troublingly
similar to those of their authoritarian partners.21
II. Theorizing the Causes of Terrorism
For centuries, people have fought asymmetrical wars against
sovereign nations in pursuit of political, social, economic, and
religious goals.22 The conflicts are often grounded in local
to Egypt in Light of Legal and Political Developments, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 644, 648
(2015) (describing the Leahy Act and restrictions on foreign aid to countries with
human rights violations).
18. See DANIEL BYMAN, THE FIVE FRONT WAR: THE BETTER WAY TO FIGHT
GLOBAL JIHAD 165 (2008) (detailing Egypt’s authoritarian practices).
19. See KHALILI, supra note 3, at 14–16 (describing repressive colonial
practices).
20. See, e.g., Wolfendale, supra note 2, at 754 (“[T]he fear of terrorism is as
much a product of counterterrorism rhetoric as it is of terrorism itself.”).
21. See infra Part IV.B (detailing human rights violations in Egypt).
22. See, e.g., SANDLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 1 (detailing terrorist campaigns
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grievances against the ruler, ruling elites, and external powerful
actors.23 The surge in international travel, trade, and migration
has expanded the reach of terrorist groups.24 Access to the internet,
social media, and other technological advancements provides
ample opportunity for non-state actors to recruit and perpetuate
violence transnationally.25 As a result, the constrictive effects of
state borders are dissipating while asymmetrical conflicts between
state and non-state actors surge.26
To effectively counter transnational terrorism, policy makers
look to what causes individuals to use violence in pursuit of their
aims. This central question has triggered lively debates among
scholars and policy makers.27 Among the cacophony of competing
from 48 A.D. through the current era of transnational terrorism).
23. See RICHARD JACKSON ET AL., TERRORISM: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 18
(2011) (noting that violent Islamist groups in the contemporary era pursue
grievances in their local and national contexts); FRANÇOIS BURGAT, ISLAMISM IN
THE SHADOW OF AL-QAEDA 40–41 (Patrick Hutchison trans., 2008) (noting that the
Arab governing elite are devoid of public support).
24. See SANDLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 1 (listing the high-profile
transnational terrorist attacks in the three decades prior to 9/11).
25. See Quan Li & Drew Schaub, Economic Globalization and Transnational
Terrorism: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 230, 249 (2004)
(noting that terrorists want to be heard and watched by large audiences, and thus
seek out media attention); JESSICA STERN & J.M. BERGER, ISIS: THE STATE OF
TERROR 124, 172–73 (2015) (describing ISIS’s electronic army that used social
media to spread its propaganda and recruit); Edward Marks & Michael B. Kraft,
The Evolving Terrorist Threat from Nixon to Trump, AM. DIPLOMACY (2017)
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2017/0106/ca/markskraft_counterterr.h
tml (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (describing terrorist groups’ sophisticated use of
the internet for recruiting) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
26. See Piazza & Walsh, supra note 15, at 127 (explaining that terrorist
groups adopt strategies to compensate for controlling fewer material resources
than governments); RONALD CRELINSTEN, COUNTERTERRORISM 3 (2009) (noting
that terrorist groups require less infrastructure than government actors). But see
Alex Braithwaite & Quan Li, Transnational Terrorism Hot Spots: Identification
and Impact Evaluation, 24 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 281, 289 (2007) (“[A]ll
else being equal, if a country is located within a hot-spot neighborhood, it is likely
to experience more future terrorist incidents than another country that does not
currently belong to such a neighborhood.”).
27. See, e.g., Katerina Dalacoura, Democracy as Counter-Terrorism in the
Middle East: A Red Herring?, 8 ULUSLARARASI İLIŞKILER 101, 103–06 (2012)
(describing political and socioeconomic factors driving Islamist terrorism);
CRELINSTEN, supra note 26, at 2 (examining how terrorist groups choose victims
of violent attacks).
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theories, two schools of thought have emerged that inform
counterterrorism policies and practices.28 The first argues that
political and socioeconomic factors such as poverty,
authoritarianism, human rights violations, political repression, an
absence of the rule of law, and inequality contribute to political
violence by non-state actors.29 The second argues ideological
factors such as religious fundamentalism, anti-capitalism,
Marxism, xenophobia, hyper-nationalism, or racism drive political
violence.30 The school of thought followed by a particular country
influences its counterterrorism strategy. The first school of
thought leads to a development and rights-based approach and the
second leads to a militarized approach. Although the United States
pays lip service to the political and socioeconomic factors that
contribute to terrorism, its counterterrorism strategies and
practices follow the militarized approach.31
The development-focused approach connects violence and
militancy to poor development indicators such as illiteracy,
poverty, rootlessness, poor governance, and rights abuses by the
state.32 Grievances arising from such conditions fester to push
28. See KATERINA DALACOURA, ISLAMIST TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE
MIDDLE EAST 24–25 (2011) (noting ideational, material, and structural causes of
terrorism).
29. See Li & Schaub, supra note 25, at 237 (posing multiple critiques of
Kruger and Malečková’s 2002 study that found no correlation between poverty
and terrorism at the individual level in Hezbollah suicide missions); Dalacoura,
supra note 27, at 103 (arguing that materialist or structural factors drive Islamic
terrorism because ideas are epiphenomenal to the underlying reasons).
30. See CRELINSTEN, supra note 26, at 196–97 (listing the ideological
influences); see also ALAN KRUEGER, WHAT MAKES A TERRORIST: ECONOMICS AND
THE ROOTS OF TERRORISM (2007) (arguing that the rich are as likely as the poor to
participate in terrorist acts); Quan Li, Does Democracy Promote or Reduce
Transnational Terrorist Incidents?, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 278, 294 (2005)
(“[D]emocratic participation reduces transnational terrorist incidents in a
country. Government constraints, subsuming the effect of press freedom, increase
the number of terrorist incidents in a country.”).
31. See infra Part III (discussing the authoritarianism present in United
States counterterrorism).
32. See, e.g., Dalacoura, supra note 27, at 103 (discussing political effects of
an authoritarian regime); see also Owen Frazer & Christian Nünlist, The Concept
of Countering Violent Extremism, 183 CSS ANALYSIS IN SECURITY POL’Y 1, 3 (2015)
(arguing that countering violent extremism programs should also address
structural causes of terrorism, such as intolerance and political, economic, or
social marginalization); Edward Newman, Exploring the “Root Causes” of
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indigenous groups into violently opposing the state and becoming
recruits for foreign terrorist groups.33 Although the majority of
poor people are not terrorists, poverty combined with structural
inequalities may facilitate terrorism recruitment.34 Relatedly,
rapid urbanization coupled with bulges of educated youth unable
to find employment commensurate with their education may
explain why middle and upper middle class individuals join
terrorist groups.35 When democratic processes are not equally
accessible to all residents or rule of law is selectively enforced to
the detriment of marginalized groups, violence becomes an
attractive means to effectuate change.36
A study of sixty-one “Islamic extremist terrorists” in the
United States, for example, found most of the suspects were at the
margins of society.37 Many were friendless, petty criminals, drug
addicts, from broken homes, or suffering a personal identity
crisis.38 Few of the would-be terrorists sought to spread Islam or
establish a caliphate. Instead, they saw themselves as defenders of
their religion against what they perceived as America’s war on
Islam.39 The American citizen who attempted to bomb Times
Terrorism, 29 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 749, 750 (2006) (explaining tactics
used by terrorists to recruit new members to support their cause).
33. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 8, at 45–46 (discussing socioeconomic factors
that make individuals susceptible to terrorist group recruitment); Bassam Tibi,
Religious Extremism or Religionization of Politics: The Ideological Foundations of
Political Islam, in RADICAL ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: CHALLENGES AND
RESPONSES 93–94 (Efraim Inbar & Hillel Frisch eds., 2007) (arguing that high
unemployment rates and social marginalization among North African Muslim
youth in France have made them more sympathetic to violent Islamist groups).
34. See CRELINSTEN, supra note 26, at 198 (noting economic factors driving
terrorism). For an analysis examining how counterterrorism programming also
disparately impacts poor and working-class communities in the United States,
see generally Khaled A. Beydoun, Between Indigence, Islamophobia, and Erasure:
Poor and Muslim in “War on Terror” America, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1463 (2016).
35. See DALACOURA, supra note 28, at 34 (describing how recruitment spans
across various socioeconomic classes).
36. See BYMAN, supra note 18, at 191 (noting the impact of a lack of
democratic process).
37. See John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart, Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and
the Internet: The American Cases, 8 DYNAMICS ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 176, 177
(2015) (examining the “radicalization” process of potential terrorists).
38. See id. (noting that many in the study could not keep employment).
39. See id. (describing that potential terrorists are motivated by revenge).
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Square in 2010 admitted to being motivated by the United States
terrorizing Muslim people and Muslim countries through drone
strikes, among other practices.40 Ironically, the more the U.S.
government imputes a criminal connotation to the term “Islamist,”
the more members of terrorist organizations believe their violent
acts are a form of legitimate revolt against state oppression.41 That
is, calling terrorism “Islamist jihad” validates terrorist groups’
propaganda that America is at war with Islam.42
Armed conflict also correlates with terrorism. The Global
Terrorism Index found that state violence and the presence of an
armed conflict are closely associated with terrorist activity.43 Over
a twenty-five year span, 92% of terrorist attacks occurred where
state violence was prevalent.44 In contrast, fewer than 0.6% of
terrorist attacks occurred in states without conflict or state
violence.45 Predictably, failed states are a magnet for terrorist
groups to set up bases from which to launch domestic and
transnational attacks.46 Indeed, the Middle Eastern countries of
Iraq, Syria, and Libya with governments who lack a monopoly over
the use of force are now hosts to branches of Al Qaeda, ISIS, and
other transnational terrorist groups.47
Taking stock of this data, the Bush Administration made
democracy promotion the defining component of its post-9/11
40. See id. at 178 (detailing a desire to be part of the solution to U.S. attacks).
41. See BURGAT, supra note 23, at 8 (discussing the impact of the American
narrative on terror).
42. See Aziz, supra note 14, at 261 (describing the recruiting narrative of
violent American military intervention and support of dictators).
43. See INST. FOR ECON. & PEACE, GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2015 68 (2015)
(describing contributing factors such as armed conflict, conflict within the
country, and corruption).
44. See id. at 70 (“92 percent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries
where the Political Terror Scale was very high.”).
45. See id. at 68 (emphasizing the link between terrorism and state security);
see also Li & Schaub, supra note 25, at 242 (finding that countries with a history
of terrorist activities have more terrorist incidents than those without a history
of terrorism).
46. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 8, at 25 (arguing that a lack of state
legitimacy bolsters support for terrorists as defenders against state injustice).
47. See Heupel, supra note 5, at 481 (stating that terrorist groups turned to
failing states instead of relying on state-provided safe havens); Walsh & Piazza,
supra note 16, at 533 (discussing terrorist groups’ strategy for growth).
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Freedom Agenda, thereby continuing America’s long history of
spreading democracy as a mainstay of its foreign policy.48 The U.S.
National Security Strategy in 2006, 2010, and 2015 all
acknowledge that for democracy to exist, civil liberties, minority
rights, and equality of all citizens must be preserved.49 The U.S.
strategy rhetorically commits to using “economic assistance,
development aid, trade, and good governance” to support new
democracies.50 By promoting democracy in Muslim majority
countries, the U.S. government believed Western security also
would be improved.51 But contrary to its rhetoric, the United
States’ counterterrorism practices bred violence.
The second school of thought attributes ideology as the cause
of terrorism, ranging from ethno-nationalism, separatism,
anarchism, anti-capitalism, neoliberalism, and religious
fundamentalism.52 During the end of the Cold War, non-state
actors using religion to justify political violence emerged.53 The
Middle East and Central Asia became the center of
fundamentalist, extremist groups seeking to overthrow

48. See Daniel Byman & Sara Bjergand Moller, The United States and the
Middle East: Interests, Risks, and Costs, in SUSTAINABLE SECURITY: RETHINKING
AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 291 (Jeremi Suri & Benjamin Valentino
eds., 2016) (discussing that the spread of democracy was essential to the
Administration’s counterterrorism strategy); see also MUSLIMS IN THE WEST AFTER
9/11: RELIGIONS, POLITICS AND LAW 93–97 (Jocelyne Cesari ed., 2010).
49. See generally EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY 6 (2006); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
5, 37–38 (2010); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
19, 21 (2015).
50. See generally EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY 4 (2006); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
5 (2010); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 21 (2015).
51. See, e.g., Dalacoura, supra note 27, at 102 (“[T]he assumption on which
the Bush counter-terrorism policy was based . . . was that authoritarianism in the
Middle East was at least one important cause of Islamist terrorism.”).
52. See Victor Asal & R. Karl Rethemeyer, The Nature of the Beast:
Organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks, 70 J. POLITICS
437, 439 (2008) (“[T]he most lethal terrorist organizations are those motivated by
both religion and ethnonationalism.”).
53. See, e.g., Walter Enders & Todd Sandler, After 9/11: Is it All Different
Now?, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 259, 263 (2005) (noting the rising influence of
fundamentalist terrorism even though state sponsored terrorism was decreasing).
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authoritarian regimes beholden to American interests.54 These
terrorists began by targeting Middle East regimes deemed the
“Near Enemy” and eventually spread to their Western
backers—the “Far Enemy.”55
Al Qaeda and its progeny, ISIS, reject the Westphalian
nation-state European model and seek to replace it with an Islamic
caliphate order.56 Attributing the Middle East’s delayed
development and moral corrosion to Western political and
economic models and American imperialism, these transnational
terrorists call for a pan-Islamic caliphate ruling all states with
Muslim-majority populations.57 To them, the Middle East’s
problems are a direct result of European colonialism that
continues to the present day through lackey dictators.58 Muslims,
therefore, have a religious duty to revolt against Western
hegemony through an Islamic awakening that will return Islamic
civilization as a dominant actor in world politics.59 For these
reasons, some scholars argue that political reforms, economic
development, or democracy promotion in Muslim majority
countries will not affect the behavior of transnational terrorists.60
54. See BURGAT, supra note 23, at 32–33 (noting the geographical
concentration of fundamentalist views).
55. See INST. FOR ECON. & PEACE, supra note 43, at 2 (noting that ISIS has
advocated for attacks against the United States, Canada, Australia, and
European countries). But see Gary LaFree et al., Trajectories of Terrorism: Attack
Patterns of Foreign Groups that have Targeted the United States, 1970–2004, 8
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 445, 470 (2009) (“[M]ost terrorist attacks by foreign
groups deemed dangerous to national security by the U.S. government are in fact
directed at non-U.S. targets.”).
56. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 23, at 46–47 (noting that
counterterrorism aims to preserve the legitimacy of the existing order and
maintaining political authority).
57. See id. at 17 (noting that modern pan-Islamism has roots in the
anti-colonial movement by Muslim intellectuals).
58. See BURGAT, supra note 23, at 40–41 (describing the lingering effects of
colonialism).
59. See, e.g., STERN & BERGER, supra note 25, at 117 (detailing ISIS
propaganda disclaiming democracy, secularism, nationalism, and other Western
ideals); DALACOURA, supra note 28, at 15, 21 (critiquing terrorism studies for
engaging in Islamic “exceptionalism”).
60. See generally F. Gregory Gause III, Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?,
FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 2005), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middleeast/2005-09-01/can-democracy-stop-terrorism (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (on file
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This reasoning, however, incorrectly assumes the rise of Islamic
political movements in the Middle East take both violent and
nonviolent forms—and overlooks that most political Islamists are
nonviolent.61
A nation’s position on the causes of terrorism shapes its
counterterrorism practices. Those who believe terrorism is
ideologically driven are more likely to adopt militaristic,
rights-infringing practices based on essentialized perceptions of
the target group’s identity.62 In contrast, a more nuanced
understanding of the social and economic causes of terrorism
recognizes the importance of civil and human rights in preventing
terrorism, thereby leaning towards a development-based
approach.63
While international legal instruments acknowledge the
importance of human rights, civil liberties, and development, it is
up to each individual nation to determine the extent to which its
counterterrorism practices comport with domestic and
international rights norms.
III. The Legal and Policy Framework for Transnational
Counterterrorism
The old adage that one person’s terrorist is another person’s
freedom fighter is no less true today than it has been throughout
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Alan B. Krueger & Jitka Malečková,
Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?, 17 J. ECON.
PERSP. 119 (2003).
61. See DALACOURA, supra note 28, at 15, 21 (noting an assumption of an
inherent association between terrorism and Islam); Krueger & Malečková, supra
note 60, at 121 (noting that majority of Islamist groups in the Middle East are
nonviolent and integrated in their respective political systems); see also Jacob
Poushter, In Nations With Significant Muslim Populations, Much Disdain for
ISIS, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2015/11/17/in-nations-with-significant-muslim-populations-much-disdainfor-isis/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (finding that data collected in eleven
Muslim-majority countries demonstrated overwhelmingly negative views of ISIS)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
62. See generally Jeremy Pressman, Rethinking Transnational
Counterterrorism: Beyond a National Framework, 30 WASH. Q. 63 (2007).
63. See generally id.
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history.64 Motivated by political, social, and economic goals,
transnational terrorists proclaim their violence is necessary to
defend against state injustice and oppression.65 Followers accept
skewed interpretations of religious and secular ideologies because
they believe their cause is just.66 Because terrorism is what one
scholar characterizes as a “gray-area phenomenon, something
between crime and war, state violence and insurgent violence,
conflict and violence, and propaganda and direct action,” the
international community cannot agree on a universal definition.67
Indeed, there is no universal definition of terrorism.68 Nonetheless,
most competing definitions of terrorism include four essential
components: (1) a violent act; (2) civilian victims; (3) the
64. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A
Policy-Oriented Assessment, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 83, 101 (2002) (“[T]he
phenomenon is as old as history, even as its manifestations have changed as a
result of new technology.”); Kennedy Graham, The Security Council and
Counterterrorism: Global and Regional Approaches to an Elusive Public Good, 17
TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 37, 40 (2005) (highlighting modern usage of the
phrase).
65. See Graham, supra note 64, at 40–45 (providing a succinct typology of
different groups that use violence for political purposes).
66. See STERN & BERGER, supra note 25, at 224 (noting that violent
apocalyptic groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS see themselves as fighting a cosmic
war between good and evil).
67. CRELINSTEN, supra note 26, at 39. The political science literature offers
the following generic definition of terrorism: “the premeditated use or threat to
use violence by individuals or subnational groups against noncombatants in order
to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience
beyond that of the immediate victim.” SANDLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 5; see also
Enders & Sandler, supra note 53, at 260 (“Terrorism is the premeditated use or
threat of use of violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political
or social objective through intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the
immediate victims.”).
68. See, e.g., Krueger & Malečková, supra note 60, at 121 (stating there are
over 100 scholarly or diplomatic definitions of terrorism). U.S. law defines
international terrorism as an intentional violent act or acts dangerous to human
life that violate U.S. criminal laws and appear to be intended to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and occurs primarily outside of the
United States. See USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272,
363 (2001). The European Union goes further to define terrorism as a set of
criminal tactics that destabilize or destroy fundamental principles of democratic
societies. See EUROPOL, TE-SAT 2010: EU TERRORISM SITUATION AND TREND
REPORT 5 (2010).
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perpetrators have a political, religious, or social motive; and
(4) terrorists seek to provoke a political reaction and spread fear.69
Notably, terrorism is not war, guerilla warfare, or insurgency even
though terrorist acts may be deployed in those contexts.70
Historically, terrorism was domestic insofar as its effect on the
citizens, institutions, property, and policies of a defined geography.
The perpetrators and the victims were from the same host country,
and the terrorist act occurred within the host country’s
jurisdiction.71 Transnational terrorism, in contrast, occurs when
individuals or entities from two or more states directly participate
in a terrorist act.72 Attacks by perpetrators in one country against
targets in another country, as well as against multilateral
organizations,73 emerged during the late 1960s when left wing
anti-capitalist terrorist groups and Palestinian liberation groups
attacked foreign corporations, multilateral organizations, and
foreign military targets.74 In the years following the September
11th attacks against the World Trade Center in New York City,
U.S. property and citizens were targeted more frequently than
other nations in large part because the U.S. military had a large
contingency in Iraq and surrounding countries.75
As transnational terrorism grew, so too did the need for
cooperation between states to counter it. In contrast to nationalist
groups, Al Qaeda and ISIS target Middle Eastern governments in
69. See STERN & BERGER, supra note 25, at 142–43 (describing terrorist
groups’ tactics and motivations); CRELINSTEN, supra note 26, at 78 (describing
common characteristics of terrorism).
70. See generally BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM (2006); SANDLER ET AL.,
supra note 4; STERN & BERGER, supra note 25.
71. See SANDLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 7–8 (describing the internal impacts
of terrorism).
72. See Shaikh, supra note 4, at 2133 (including incidents originating in one
country and ending in another).
73. See SANDLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 8 (discussing the various models of
transnational terrorist attacks).
74. See id. at 12; DALACOURA, supra note 28.
75. See SANDLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 8 (citing data showing that in 2006,
40% of transnational terrorism was directed at U.S. interests); David P. Oakley
& Patrick Proctor, Ten Years of GWOT, the Failure of Democratization and the
Fallacy of “Ungoverned Spaces”, 5 J. STRATEGIC SECURITY 8, 8 (2012) (noting the
United States spent eight years and approximately $806 billion in Iraq since
2003).
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their quest to replace the Westphalian nation-state model with a
pre-modern pan-Islamic caliphate.76 The rise in transnational
terrorism
has
made
states’
counterterrorism
policies
interdependent,
and
generated
multiple
international
counterterrorism instruments.77 Even before the September 11th
attacks triggered a flurry of interstate coordination, the United
Nations was coordinating counterterrorism among states.78
A. Prioritizing Terrorism Prevention
In 1994, the UN General Assembly issued the Declaration on
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism.79 The UN urged
states “to take all appropriate measures at the national and
international levels to eliminate terrorism”80 and emphasized “the
need further to strengthen international cooperation between
States.”81 The Security Council invoked its authority under Article
39 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter to demand that states actively
root out terrorists within their territories.82 Security Council
Resolution 1373 (drafted primarily by the United States) was
issued on September 28, 2001 and declared that terrorism is a per
se threat to international peace and security.83 Similarly, Security
76. See, e.g., DALACOURA, supra note 28, at 12 (explaining that terrorist
groups oppose Western forms of government). But see JACKSON ET AL., supra note
23, at 22–23 (noting that Western military interventions or civil war situations
allow Islamist extremist groups to fight alongside resistance groups and to impose
their politico-religious narrative on the national struggle).
77. See G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 71 (Oct. 24, 2005) (“We acknowledge that we are
living in an interdependent and global world and that many of today’s threats
recognize no national boundaries, are interlinked and must be tackled at the
global, regional and national levels in accordance with the Charter and
international law.”).
78. See Graham, supra note 64, at 45–49 (discussing modern
counterterrorism coordination before 2001).
79. See G.A. Res. 49/60, ¶ 1 (Dec. 9, 1994) (calling for international
cooperation and development of international law).
80. Id. ¶ 4.
81. G.A. Res. 51/210, annex (Dec. 17, 1996).
82. See U.N. Charter art. 43 (authorizing investigation into any dispute or
situation which might threaten international security).
83. See S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1 (Sept. 28, 2001) (calling for states to complement
all international counterterrorism efforts).
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Council Resolutions 1377 (2001), 1540 (2004), 1566 (2004), and
1624 (2006) situated international terrorism as the most serious
threat to international peace and called on states to participate in
a “sustained, comprehensive approach involving the active
participation and collaboration of Member States of the United
Nations . . . to combat the scourge of international terrorism.”84
The Security Council called on all states to impose
anti-terrorism criminal sanctions in domestic laws and prosecute
any person who finances, plans, prepares, or perpetrates terrorists
acts or supports such acts.85 States were obliged to prevent
individuals and groups from using their territory for transnational
terrorism, prohibit terrorists from moving through their territory,
strengthen security of international borders, combat fraudulent
travel documents, and share relevant counterterrorism
information with other states.86
To monitor states’ compliance with counterterrorism
obligations and facilitate technical assistance with limited
implementation capacities, Resolution 1373 established the
Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC)—which notably left out the
importance of compliance with human rights law.87 Instead, the
84. S.C. Res. 1377, ¶ 2 (Nov. 12, 2001).
85. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 83, ¶ 1 (criminalizing direct or indirect
funding); Kim Lane Scheppele, The International Standardization of National
Security Law, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 437, 449 (2010) (arguing the UN’s
demands for states to change their domestic laws were unprecedented).
86. See Heupel, supra note 5, at 489 (noting that the strategy addresses the
distinct features of transnational terrorism); see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2001 viii (2002) (noting the coordination of
intelligence sharing between the United States and its Middle East allies in global
war on terror).
87. See DUFFY, supra note 13, at 546 (linking the resolution to human rights
violations).
Like
other
international
obligations,
counterterrorism
implementation is not consistent across countries. To address compliance
problems, policy makers adopt one of two methodologies. The Enforcement School
deters non-compliance by “controlling the cost-benefit calculation of states
through monitoring and the threat or use of sanctions in the cases of norms
violation.” Heupel, supra note 5, at 483. The Management School assumes that
states intend to comply with international rules but fail to do so due to insufficient
economic or political capacity. As such, proponents of this school recommend
problem-solving and capacity building strategies rather than enforcement
strategies. Id.; see also Scheppele, supra note 85, at 443 (“[W]idespread
compliance with the Resolution 1373 framework makes the anti-terrorism
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CTC focuses on UN member states’ compliance with
counterterrorism practices through periodic reports.88
By 2005, there were at least thirteen international
instruments related to the prevention and suppression of terrorism
and the Security Council had issued five resolutions.89 In 2006, the
United Nations issued its first Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
based on four pillars: (1) addressing the conditions conducive to the
spread of terrorism; (2) preventing and combatting terrorism;
(3) building states’ capacity and strengthening the role of the
United Nations; and (4) ensuring human rights and the rule of
law.90 In the years following 9/11, the second pillar of the UN’s
counterterrorism
strategy—preventing
and
combatting
terrorism—dominated international efforts, at the expense of
human rights, rule of law, and civil liberties.91
B. Unfulfilled Commitments to Human Rights
Shortly after the September 11th terrorist attacks, the
General Assembly emphasized the importance of “promot[ing] and
protect[ing] human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as
due process and the rule of law, while countering terrorism” in its
multiple resolutions calling for the protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.92 The Security
Council also recognized that counterterrorism measures should
comply with international human rights, refugee, and
campaign an extraordinary example in international law.”).
88. See PLESSIS, supra note 3, at 45 (noting that the CTC identifies priority
areas by reviewing states’ reports).
89. See, e.g., Heupel, supra note 5, at 488–90 (describing resolutions
prohibiting the movement of terrorists, implementing sanctions, and suppressing
weapons proliferation).
90. See G.A. Res. 60/288, at 1–2 (Sept. 20, 2006) (reaffirming the need for
cooperation among states).
91. See DUFFY, supra note 13, at 554 (highlighting the emphasis on security
over individual rights).
92. See generally G.A. Res. 57/219 (Feb. 27, 2003); G.A. Res. 58/187 (Mar. 22,
2004); G.A. Res. 59/191 (Mar. 10, 2005); G.A. Third Comm., Recognizing the Role
of Human Rights Defenders and the Need for Their Protection, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/70/L.46/Rev. 1 (Nov. 13, 2015).
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humanitarian law.93 The 2005 General Assembly World Summit
Outcome Resolution declared “[s]tates must ensure that any
measures taken to combat terrorism comply with their obligations
under international law, in particular human rights law, refugee
law and international humanitarian law.”94 As egregious human
rights violations came to light, the UN Commission on Human
Rights appointed a special rapporteur on the promotion and
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while
countering terrorism.95 That same year, the United Nations
developed a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
The UN emphasized human rights as an integral part of
effective counterterrorism, and reiterated its commitment to
sponsor programs that “promote dialogue, tolerance and
understanding among civilizations, cultures, peoples and religions,
and to promote mutual respect for and prevent the defamation of
religions, religious values, beliefs, and cultures.”96 In rejecting the
clash of civilizations narrative, the Secretary General launched the
Alliance of Civilizations.97 This initiative brought together
governments and civil society to “improve understanding and
cooperative relations among nations and peoples across cultures
and religions—in particular, between the so called Western and
Muslim societies—and in the process, to help counter the forces
that fuel polarization and extremism.”98
93. See G.A. Res. 60/288, annex (Sept. 20, 2006) (emphasizing the legal
obligations for prosecuting terrorist suspects). Notably, some Security Council
resolutions did not include provisions recognizing the importance of protecting
human rights. See S.C. Res. 1377 (Nov. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1455 (Jan. 17, 2003).
But see S.C. Res. 1456, ¶ 6 (Jan. 20, 2003) (“States must ensure that any measure
taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international
law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in
particular international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law.”).
94. G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 85 (Oct. 24, 2005).
95. See Human Rights Council Res. 2005/80, ¶ 14 (Apr. 21, 2005) (appointing
a special rapporteur to identify best practices to counter terrorism).
96. G.A. Res. 60/288, supra note 90, at 4.
97. See id. (promoting dialogue, tolerance and understanding); History,
UNITED NATIONS ALLIANCE OF CIVILIZATIONS, https://www.unaoc.org/who-weare/history/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2018) (noting the Alliance’s formation against
the backdrop of the global war on terror) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
98. History, supra note 97.
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In direct contradiction to these commitments, the U.S.
military and intelligence agencies bombed suspected terrorist
training camps, kidnapped suspected terrorists into secret
rendition programs, tortured terrorism suspects, and placed
suspects in indefinite detention in Guantanamo and other military
bases in Central Asia and the Middle East.99 Law enforcement
agencies created travel screening watchlists and No Fly Lists,
spied on Muslim and Arab communities based on racial and ethnic
profiling, designated Muslim civil society groups as terrorists,
prosecuted Muslims for material support to terrorism, froze assets
of Islamic charities, and deported Muslims suspected of holding
anti-Western political views or religious associations.100
Counterterrorism practices treated Muslim, Arab, and South
Asian individuals and communities as potential terrorists.101
Security discourse grounded in fear and stereotypes equating
terrorism with Islam, thereby propagating the narrative that
Islam and the West are engaged in a clash of civilizations.102 Islam
and Muslims replaced Communism and Russians, respectively, as
the civilizational threat to Western democracy.103 Transnational
99. See Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 3
(describing aggressive methods of torture).
100. See DUFFY, supra note 13, at 550 (arguing that counterterrorism efforts
lead to marginalization of individual rights); JACKSON ET AL., supra note 23, at 66
(discussing how the “evil international terrorist” became associated with
“Eastern” otherness, thereby resulting in increased insecurity for Muslim
communities due to intensified counterterrorism focused on them); see also G.A.
Res. 54/109, ¶ 1 (Feb. 25, 2000) (adopting the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism to criminalize and punish terrorist
financing acts).
101. See HERMAN, supra note 3, at 197 (describing targeted surveillance
tactics).
102. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 23, at 23 (detailing the impact of divisive
rhetoric); President George W. Bush, Address to Congress (Sept. 20, 2001) (“This
is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe
in progress and pluralism, tolerance, and freedom.”).
103. See LISA STAMPNITZKY, DISCIPLINING TERROR: HOW EXPERTS INVENTED
“TERRORISM” 49–83 (2013) (arguing that political discourse crafted Islam as a
threat to Western ideals); Sahar F. Aziz, Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective
Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 429, 475 (2012)
(noting that the United States disproportionately focuses on terrorist acts
committed by Muslims); Dalia F. Fahmy, The Green Scare is Not McCarthyism
2.0: How Islamophobia is Redefining the Use of Propaganda in Foreign and
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terrorists leveraged this apocalyptic narrative to recruit
disaffected, impoverished, and oppressed young men in Muslim
majority and Western countries to join their proclaimed just
cause.104 And human rights groups added the United States to
their list of nations who violated human rights.105
IV. The Authoritarianization Effect of Transnational
Counterterrorism
The commitment to cooperate with Middle Eastern nations to
stop transnational terrorism has been a consistent message from
the White House since 2001.106 President Bush pledged “to
strengthen our partnership with every nation that joins in the fight
against terror. We deepened our security cooperation with allies
like Jordan and Egypt, and with our friends in the Gulf.”107
President Obama proclaimed in his 2011 National Strategy for
Counterterrorism that the “United States alone cannot eliminate
every terrorist or terrorist organization that threatens our safety,
security, or interests . . . we must join with key partners and allies
to share the burdens of common security.”108 While the Obama
Administration admitted these partners do not share America’s
values, it believed through cooperation the United States would
“demonstrat[e] through our example the value of upholding human
rights and responsible governance [and] these partners will
ultimately be more stable and successful if they move toward these
principles.”109
Domestic Affairs, 39 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 63, 67 (2015).
104. See STERN & BERGER, supra note 25, at 194–95 (discussing the
deployment of identity-based extremism in the Middle East and use of narratives
of battles between good and evil).
105. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF SECURITY:
COUNTERTERRORISM LAWS WORLDWIDE SINCE SEPTEMBER 11 10–16 (2012)
(describing the UN’s unprecedented counterterrorism resolutions).
106. See Byman & Moller, supra note 48, at 288–99 (noting that Egypt,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen were especially valued for their cooperation).
107. President George W. Bush, Address at the Saban Forum (Dec. 5, 2008).
108. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM 7 (2011).
109. Id.
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What appears to have occurred, however, is the opposite. The
United States violated human rights abroad and expanded
executive power at the expense of civil liberties at home. All the
while, Middle East partners have become more authoritarian in
their practices using national security as pretext. Human rights
are not advancing as a result of transnational counterterrorism
coordination. Instead, authoritarian practices are spreading to
Western nations.110
To be sure, I am not arguing the United States has become an
authoritarian state. Rather, I posit that formal and informal
transnational counterterrorism coordination facilitates Middle
East authoritarian practices influencing the United States in ways
that erode civil liberties at home and human rights abroad.111 The
shift from a criminal law enforcement paradigm to an open-ended
war model, for example, places the United States in an unofficial
state of emergency.112 With that comes deference to
rights-infringing national security practices. Fewer rights and
liberties become the new normal.
Expansions in executive authority under the auspices of
national security coupled with legislative changes have
circumscribed the oversight role of the courts.113 Politicians’
rhetoric inflates fears of terrorists waiting to strike at any
moment.114 The media exacerbates the public’s fears through
extensive coverage of terrorism while leaving out data showing the
likelihood of being killed by a terrorist attack is miniscule; not to
mention the overwhelming majority of terrorist attacks are
directed at non-U.S. targets.115 Nevertheless, Congress passes laws
110. See infra Part IV.C (detailing the normalization of torture and
surveillance by the United States government).
111. See Hafner-Burton & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 415 (arguing that the
United States must protect human rights to effectively fight the war on terror).
112. See Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 14, 2001)
(declaring a national state of emergency due to the immediate threat of future
terror attacks).
113. See Setty, supra note 2, at 671–72 (arguing that the judiciary has
acquiesced to the aggressive counterterrorism methods); DUFFY, supra note 13, at
593–94 (noting the shift in power from the judiciary to the political branches).
114. See generally President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address
(Jan. 29, 2002).
115. See LaFree et al., supra note 55, at 468 (“[B]etween 1970 and 2004, more

U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM

1595

granting the president expansive authorities and judges defer to
executive action.116 Over time, such trends have led to abuses of
authority arising from the concentration of power in the executive
branch.117
By comparing the national security practices of a dominant
Middle East country and longtime U.S. ally, Egypt, with those of
the United States, I demonstrate how transnational
counterterrorism may be contributing to the normalization of
human rights and civil liberties violations in Western
democracies.118 Although counterterrorism coordination is not the
sole cause of U.S. rights violations, it is an overlooked factor that
warrants further scrutiny by government officials and citizens
seeking to reverse the misguided subordination of rights to
security. My comparison focuses on five practices: (1) torture;
(2) indefinite detention; (3) inhumane conditions of detention;
(4) mass surveillance; and (5) selective enforcement of
anti-terrorism laws against Muslims and dissidents.
A common theme permeating these rights-infringing practices
is the reduced levels of due process afforded targets as a result of
judicial inaction, legislative mandate, or executive fiat in a
secretive counterterrorism regime.119 Moreover, these practices
occurred despite ratification of international human rights
agreements that prohibit both Egypt and the United States from
engaging in such practices.120 That the United States is
than 96% of more than 16,000 terrorist attacks were in fact directed at non-U.S.
targets.”).
116. See generally DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY
AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (2009).
117. See Setty, supra note 2, at 644 (emphasizing the lack of accountability
and oversight of the executive branch); Joanna Baltes et al., Convicted Terrorists:
Sentencing Considerations and Their Policy Implications, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L.
& POL’Y 347, 348 (2016) (noting the lack of transparency surrounding the
executive’s discretion on whether or not to seek execution).
118. See JEREMY M. SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33003, EGYPT:
BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS 11 (2017) (detailing Egypt’s use of mass trials
and anti-protest laws).
119. See DUFFY, supra note 13, at 902 (describing the loss of individual rights).
120. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (obligating states to protect the right to life; right to be free from
torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; right to a fair trial by an
independent and impartial court; and right to humane conditions of detention).
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systemically violating these commitments with impunity evinces a
troubling transnational race to the bottom.121
A. Coordination in Counterterrorism Between the United States
and Middle East Countries
While international coordination predated the September
11th terrorist attacks, the frequency and scope of counterterrorism
coordination afterward expanded dramatically.122 United States
national security strategy documents emphasized working with
foreign partners as essential to counterterrorism efforts.123 Law
enforcement agencies share intelligence, conduct joint trainings
and operations, and collaborate on countering radicalization.124
Coordinated intelligence gathering is also an essential component
of transnational counterterrorism.125 For instance, thousands of
FBI agents work with their foreign counterparts to prevent
terrorist attacks from Al Qaeda, ISIS, and other organizations.126
Egyptian officials tout their intelligence sharing and participation
Egypt was the first Arab country to sign the UN Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and yet it is
among the most egregious torturers in the region. See James J. Napoli, Egypt’s
Campaign Against Islamists, and Human Rights Concerns, Heat Up, WASH. REP.
ON MIDDLE E. AFF., Aug. 1993, at 54; CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32438, U.N.
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE (CAT): OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION TO
INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES (2010).
121. See generally CHALLENGING U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS SINCE 9/11
(Ann Fagan Ginger ed., 2005).
122. See, e.g., PLESSIS, supra note 3, at 43 (describing 9/11 as the catalyst for
new areas of cooperation to combat terrorism).
123. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 108, at 9 (stating
the necessity of partnering with states that face terrorist threats).
124. See id. at 7 (stating that partnering leads to increased stability); PLESSIS,
supra note 3, at 37–38 (describing efforts to gather evidence across borders). But
see WADIE E. SAID, CRIMES OF TERROR 14–16 (2015) (critiquing
counter-radicalization as using religious orthodoxy as a proxy for terrorism).
125. See generally Letter from Donald J. Trump, President of the U.S., to
Congressional Leaders (June 6, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Byman & Moller, supra note 48.
126. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COUNTERING THE THREAT OF TERRORISM,
INCLUDING COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE 2 (2014) (noting that federal
agent work in surveillance, infrastructure, and partnerships).
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in coalition meetings aimed at coordinating counterterrorism
strategy and operations.127 But the disparate legal regimes
governing U.S. and Middle Eastern security officers result in U.S.
officials having access to intelligence obtained through torture and
other human rights violations.128
Separate from questions about the veracity of the information,
intelligence sharing incentivizes outsourcing intelligence
collection to Middle East officials unrestrained by laws and norms
that protect human rights and civil liberties. Moreover, joint
intelligence gathering operations provide opportunities for
American
counterterrorism
officers
to
participate
in
rights-infringing methods of intelligence gathering, as is the case
in the extraordinary rendition program.129
Military cooperation with Middle Eastern countries has also
increased.130 Since 9/11, the United States military has expanded
its basing and access rights; bolstered defense cooperation; and
sold military equipment to Jordan, Egypt, the United Arab
Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.131 U.S. military bases in Kuwait,
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, the UAE, Turkey, and
Afghanistan facilitate counterterrorism coordination among
military personnel.132 Additionally, a secret unmanned aerial
127. See Egypt-U.S. Relations, EMBASSY OF EGYPT, http://www.egypt
embassy.net/egypt-us-relations/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (stating a mutual
commitment to advancing regional stability) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
128. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 86, at viii (describing U.S. law
enforcement’s ability to investigate potential terrorists).
129. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “WORK ON HIM UNTIL HE CONFESSES” 21–26
(2011) (detailing regular torture by Egypt’s federal law enforcement). An
additional concern is the abuse of shared intelligence by a foreign agency to
persecute a citizen rather than prevent a crime or terrorist act. See Petra
Bartosiewicz, Deploying Informants, the FBI Stings Muslims, NATION (June 14,
2012),
https://www.thenation.com/article/deploying-informants-fbi-stingsmuslims/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (reporting on the arrest and torture of Yonas
Fikre, a Muslim American from Portland, Oregon, while he was in the United
Arab Emirates on the instruction of the U.S. intelligence services) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
130. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DANGEROUS DEALINGS 2 (2002) (citing
increased international presence).
131. See Byman & Moller, supra note 48, at 263–64 (documenting personnel
and equipment expansion).
132. See id. at 265–66 (describing operations of U.S. military bases in the
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vehicle base is reportedly operating out of Saudi Arabia that is
used for drone attacks against targets in Yemen.133
As transnational terrorism spread across the Middle East,
U.S. military arms sales soared. In 2011, the United States
finalized a $29 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia and a $10
billion deal with the UAE.134 In 2017, the Trump Administration
signed a $110 billion multi-year arms sale to Saudi Arabia, the
largest in history between the two countries, and sold $12 billion
of U.S. arms to Qatar.135 Cooperation also comes in the form of
training programs aimed at enhancing transnational
counterterrorism. Through the Antiterrorism Assistance Program,
for example, the United States trains law enforcement and
security services of foreign allies.136 Similarly, “the U.S. Central
Command (USCENTCOM), which covers the Middle East, North
Africa, and Asia, conducted forty-five multilateral and bilateral
training exercises” with Middle Eastern, North African, and Asian
countries137 and hosts a biennial multinational training exercise
hosted by Egypt and the United States.138
The Combatting Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) trains
foreign mid-level and senior level security and military officials.
The Department of Defense (DOD) manages the CTFP to build

Middle East).
133. See Micah Zenko & Emma Welch, Where the Drones Are, FOREIGN POL’Y
(May 29, 2012, 11:36 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/05/29/where-the-dronesare/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (reporting that the United States uses the base
for surveillance and combat missions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
134. See Byman & Moller, supra note 48, at 267 (outlining the weapons deal).
135. See US State Department Approves Saudi Arabia Arms Sale, BBC NEWS
(Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-34838937 (last visited
Sept. 10, 2018) (stating the Saudi Arabia is one of the biggest buyers of U.S.
weapons) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
136. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 86, at xiii (noting training areas
including airport security and hostage rescue).
137. DAKOTA L. WOOD, 2018 INDEX OF U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH 145 (2018).
138. See U.S., Egypt Kick Off Exercise Bright Star 2017, U.S. CENT. COMMAND,
http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-ArticleView/Article/1308877/us-egypt-kick-off-exercise-bright-star-2017/ (last visited
Sept. 10, 2018) (detailing the combined field training exercise between Egypt and
the United States) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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partnerships with foreign allies.139 According to the DOD, “[t]he
CTFP provides unique relationship and capacity-building
opportunities that enable partner nations to address threats of
terrorism within their borders and regions and strengthens
collaboration with and support for U.S. and partner efforts to
defeat terrorism.”140 Over 250 foreign officials have participated in
the program.141 In 2015, a CTFP alumni event was held in Amman,
Jordan where more than forty alumni from twenty countries
discussed strategies on how to respond to ISIS, Boko Haram,
Al-Shabaab, and Al Qaeda.142
Additionally, American police and intelligence officers are sent
to foreign countries through bilateral arrangements where they
build relationships and a network for international cooperation.143
Through these interactions, information, skills, and norms are
exchanged at the institutional and individual level.144
Contrary to commonly held assumptions that Western liberal
democratic norms are transferred to foreign allies, the exchange is
two-way. Western officials learn from their Middle East
counterparts that the only way to eradicate terrorism is with an
iron-fisted, militarized approach.145 As a result, rights infringing
practices and norms have infected how the United States counters
terrorism both at home and abroad.146
139. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REGIONAL DEFENSE COMBATING TERRORISM
FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM 1 (2015) (outlining the program’s objectives).
140. Id. at 3.
141. See id. at 1 (reporting a budget of $4,767,190 for the 256 participants).
142. See id. at 11 (describing alumni panels on combatting radical
extremism).
143. See International Operations, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadershipand-structure/international-operations (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (providing an
overview of the FBI’s international program) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
144. See id. (describing the exchange of training information).
145. See Steven Erlanger, Israeli Leader Promises to Use ‘Iron Fist’ to Stop
Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/02/
international/middleeast/israeli-leader-promises-to-use-iron-fist-to-stop.html
(last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (discussing Israel’s acting prime minister, Ehud
Olmert’s, advice to remove all restrictions on the counterterrorism security
establishment) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
146. See Scheppele, supra note 85, at 451 (“The problem with the
rights-violating aspects of the Security Council framework, then, is not with the
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B. Rights-Infringing Counterterrorism in the Middle East: The
Case of Egypt
Middle Eastern regimes have long invoked national security
as a ruse to eliminate political opposition, silence dissenters, and
to quash civil society.147 The mantra of counterterrorism grants the
state unfettered discretion to kill, torture, indefinitely detain,
surveil, and prosecute those deemed a threat to the regime.148
These practices pre-dated 9/11, and in fact have been the basis of
international calls for democratization of the region.149
Egypt—a longtime ally and counterterrorism partner of the
United States—illustrates how a Middle Eastern state uses
counterterrorism to violate human rights and civil liberties. Some
of
these
authoritarian
practices
have
shaped
U.S.
counterterrorism practices, albeit not to the same degree.
Egregious forms of physical abuse have been a mainstay of
Egyptian counterterrorism strategies for decades.150 By making
the cost of dissent prohibitively costly, torture is a strategy that
deters citizens from challenging the state’s authority.151 Causing
the population to cower in fear, the regime proclaims harsh
counterterrorism practices are necessary to preserve the security
of the state.152 The regime’s autocratic grip on political power, not
the people’s security, is the real objective.153
intentions of the Security Council, but with the terrible quality of governance in
many states in the world . . . .”).
147. See Jason Brownlee, A New Generation of Autocracy in Egypt, 14 BROWN
J. WORLD AFF. 73, 77 (2008) (“This political elite still employs national security
rhetoric to justify draconian assaults on civilian activists.”).
148. See id. at 78 (describing violent assaults on protestors).
149. See id. at 83 (noting that parties calling for democratization included the
United States).
150. See Egypt: 7,400 Civilians Tried in Military Courts, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Apr. 13, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/13/egypt-7400civilians-tried-military-courts (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (stating that most were
sentenced after mass trials with no due process rights) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
151. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: TORTURE AND
DETENTION IN EGYPT 72 (1992) (reporting torture as deterrence and punishment).
152. See id. (discussing the regimen’s motivation for torture).
153. See id. (“[T]he policy of the political security apparatus is to keep things
under control.”).
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The Mubarak regime engaged in widespread and systematic
torture.154 A new counterterrorism law passed in 1992 granted
police and security forces extensive powers to arrest, detain, and
torture hundreds of people accused of belonging to political
Islamist organizations.155 Terrorist detainees first disappeared
into secret prisons outside the purview of law in order to be
subjected to torture to extract information and coerce false
confessions.156 Police also tortured detainees to pressure them to
be informants on their friends, family, and co-workers upon
release.157 Employing thousands of informants expanded the reach
of intelligence services’ extensive monitoring and mass
surveillance of the population—a feature of the post-9/11 national
security regime in the United States.158
Although dissidents of various political stripes have been
victims of torture by the state, political Islamists have borne the
brunt of the abuse.159 Detainees are forcibly disappeared and
tortured by the state in locations unknown to their families or
lawyers.160 Human rights reports document cases of torture by
Egyptian security forces as far back as the 1980s. For instance,
Amnesty International’s report “Ten Years of Torture” documents
myriad forms of torture of Egyptian prisoners including being:
154. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2011: EGYPT, 2–3 (2011)
(depicting regular torture by police and security forces).
155. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, EGYPT: HUMAN RIGHTS BACKGROUND, 2001 1
(2001) (stating that hundreds of civilians were sent to military court).
156. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 129, at 4 (stating that security
court trials relied on coerced confessions).
157. See AMNESTY INT’L, EGYPT: TEN YEARS OF TORTURE 2 (1991) (reporting
that citizens were forced to collect information on friends or colleagues).
158. See David Smith, Presumed Suspect: Post-9/11 Intelligence Gathering,
Race, and the First Amendment, 11 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR EASTERN L. 85,
94– 95 (2011–2012) (outlining the FBI’s post-9/11 counterterrorism strategy).
159. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 157, at 1 (describing wide-scale political
arrests); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, POLICE, MILITARY TORTURE AND ABUSES 530
(2013) (reporting at least eleven custodial deaths caused by police torture and
several cases of torture by the military).
160. See Egypt: Counterterrorism Law Erodes Basic Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Aug. 19, 2015, 1:45 AM), www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/19/egypt-counterterrorismlaw-erodes-basic-rights (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (noting that citizens were
forcibly disappeared without access to lawyers) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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[B]lindfolded, stripped of their clothes and suspended from their
wrists, bound or handcuffed together, sometimes in contorted
positions, from the tops of doors or from barred windows.
Victims have described how they have been forced to lie on their
backs, their hands and feet bound together, a chair forced up
under their armpits, another keeping their knees apart to
restrict the body’s involuntary spasms as electric shocks were
applied repeatedly to their nipples and genitals. Between
torture sessions they were forced to stand in unnatural
positions, often with arms and legs outstretched, for hours on
end and beaten if they moved. Some were sexually abused.161

These same torture tactics were unleashed on post-9/11
terrorism suspects held in Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and multiple
extraordinary rendition sites.
Detainees in Egyptian jails also frequently died from torture
in what amounted to extrajudicial killings.162 The lucky ones
survived only after they confessed to the state’s accusations.163
Similar to the U.S. military round ups in Afghanistan and
Pakistan after 9/11, most victims were innocent civilians rounded
up arbitrarily after a terrorist attack.164 Confessions extracted
under torture were then used as evidence in political trials without
question to their veracity.165
Because of legal and political impunity for security forces, very
few torture victims obtain a remedy for their abuse, including in
the United States.166 Calls for prosecution of high-level U.S.
161. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 157, at 1.
162. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 129, at 60–71 (detailing various
torture-related deaths).
163. See Egypt: 7,400 Civilians Tried in Military Court, supra note 150
(documenting cases of systemic torture by the Egyptian security service).
164. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 157, at 2 (noting that many are held
without charge or trial); Only Three of 116 Guantanamo Detainees Were Captured
by US Forces, GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/aug/25/
guantanamo-detainees-captured-pakistan-afghanistan (last updated Aug. 27,
2015) (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (describing the U.S. Guantanamo detainees)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
165. See SAID, supra note 124, at 84–85 (discussing the case of Ahmed Omar
Abu Ali wherein a confession extracted by Saudi officials allegedly during torture
was used to prosecute Abu Ali in U.S. court).
166. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 129, at 84 (noting the
government’s failure to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of torture); TRUDY
BOND ET AL., SHADOW REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE AGAINST
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intelligence officials for torture of terrorism suspects have fallen
on deaf ears.167 This system of impunity signals to officials that
although torture may be illegal under international and domestic
law, abusing detainees can continue without fear of prosecution.168
In addition to being tortured, detainees are subjected to
inhumane prison conditions in violation of human rights law.169
According to a 1993 Human Rights Watch report, detainees were
crammed in cells without toilets or running water.170 They were
forced to sleep on filthy floors without mattresses or blankets.171
Breaks were insufficiently afforded to detainees, and those granted
ranged from merely five minutes to thirty minutes.172 Beatings and
solitary confinement for weeks were common disciplinary tools
imposed by abusive guards beyond external oversight or
accountability.173 Similar allegations surfaced in Guantanamo,
Bagram, and Abu Ghraib prisons managed by U.S. officials and
their contractors.174 More than ten years later, another Human
Rights Watch report found torture in Egypt remained pervasive.175
Interviews in 2015 with nineteen torture victims found that

TORTURE ON THE REVIEW OF THE PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 16 (2014) (stating that U.S. courts refused jurisdiction).
167. See BOND ET AL., supra note 166, at 6–10 (arguing that the U.S. has
neither investigated nor prosecuted torture claims).
168. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GETTING AWAY WITH TORTURE? COMMAND
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE U.S. ABUSE OF DETAINEES 30 (2005) (detailing that the
U.S. selectively complies with international law).
169. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRISON CONDITIONS IN EGYPT: A FILTHY
SYSTEM 29 (1993) (stating the government’s noncompliance with prisoner rights
law).
170. See id. at 48 (describing that facilities were inadequate or inoperative).
171. See id. at 54 (detailing prisoners’ sleeping accommodations).
172. See id. at 78 (noting that daily breaks were short and infrequent).
173. See id. at 66 (documenting periods of solitary confinement up to four
months).
174. See Matt Apuzzo et al., How U.S. Torture Left a Legacy of Damaged
Minds, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/09/world/cia-tortureguantanamo-bay.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (reporting prisoner conditions
in Guantanamo Bay) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
175. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “WE DO UNREASONABLE THINGS
HERE”: TORTURE AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN AL-SISI’S EGYPT (2017).
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Egyptian security officers electrocuted, beat, and hung detainees
by their limbs to force suspects to read prewritten confessions.176
When faced with allegations of violating human rights laws,
the Egyptian regime points to national security laws granting the
executive broad leeway to take all appropriate measures to
maintain the general order and security of the nation.177
Emergency law, intermittently in effect since 1967 and
continuously in effect since Sadat’s assassination in 1981, provided
security forces legal cover for human rights violations.178
Emergency law grants the president broad authority to detain
persons deemed a threat to security and public order, leaving it to
prosecutors and security forces to define “threat,” “security,” and
“public order” when conducting investigations.179 With the legal
authority to hold detainees for up to forty-five days renewable
indefinitely, the Interior Ministry has free reign to indefinitely
detain and torture these disappeared detainees.180 For those
charged with a crime, the prosecution delays the trial for years,
denying them due process rights.181
176. See id. at 1–6 (noting that these individuals could not contact relatives
or an attorney).
177. See generally Mohamed A. Arafa, Egypt Between Fear & Reform in its
Second Revolution: The Failure to Protect the Fundamental Human Rights Over
and Over Again, 7 ARIZ. SUMMIT L. REV. 1 (2013).
178. See TAMIR MOUSTAFA, LAW AND RESISTANCE IN AUTHORITARIAN STATES:
THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN EGYPT 154 (Tom Ginsburg ed., 2008)
(detailing Egypt’s emergency laws); Lisa Reynolds Wolfe, Cold War Legacy:
Egypt’s Emergency Law 162 of 1958, COLD WAR STUD. (Feb. 1, 2011),
https://coldwarstudies.com/2011/02/01/cold-war-legacy-egypts-emergency-law162-of-1958/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (outlining key provisions of Egypt’s law)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
179. See MOUSTAFA, supra note 178, at 154 (noting arbitrary execution of the
laws).
180. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 157, at 2 (stating that the government
could hold detainees without charge or trial); MOUSTAFA, supra note 178, at 154
(discussing reports by the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights documenting
over 7,800 cases of recurrent detention).
181. See Damian Cullen, Trial of Ibrahim Halawa in Egypt Delayed for 13th
Time, IRISH TIMES (Mar. 6, 2016, 1:05 PM), http://www.irishtimes.com/
news/ireland/irish-news/trial-of-ibrahim-halawa-in-egypt-delayed-for-13th-time1.2562118 (last updated Mar. 6, 2016) (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (reporting that
one detainee was imprisoned for 942 days) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); Marwa Al-Asar, Egyptian Rights Group Accuses Justice System of
Double Standards, MIDDLE EAST EYE, http://www.middleeasteye.net/
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Although the Egyptian government claims stringent
anti-terrorism laws are necessary to deter and prosecute terrorists,
the laws are frequently applied to civil society organizations and
leaders who report on the state’s human rights violations. In the
1990s, the president of the Egyptian Organization for Human
Rights (EOHR), Hafez Abu Saada, was arrested and interrogated
in retaliation for EOHR’s report documenting torture, deaths in
custody, disappearances and horrible prison conditions.182 The
case of Professor Sa’ad Eddin Ibrahim in 2001 further proved how
far the government would go to quash nonviolent challenges to
corruption, election irregularities, and abuse of power.183 Ibrahim,
who held dual Egyptian and American citizenship, investigated
election fraud and requested that the United States link foreign
aid to Egypt’s human rights performance.184 In retaliation, the
Egyptian government prosecuted Ibrahim in the Supreme State
Security Court where he was charged with conspiring to bribe
public officials, disseminating false information harmful to Egypt’s
interest, and embezzling foreign funds.185
Prosecutions of civil society leaders soared after the 2011 mass
uprisings as the regime sought to regain its authoritarian grip on
power.186 Journalists, lawyers, and human rights advocates were
arrested and charged with threatening national security in

news/egyptian-rights-group-accuses-justice-system-double-standards-525727160
(last updated June 3, 2015) (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (reporting that multiple
defendants were held for over two years after an amendment to the code of
criminal procedure changed the two year limit for pretrial detention to periods of
forty-five renewable days) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
182. See BENJAMIN STACHURSKY, THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF
TRANSNATIONALIZATION 97 (2013) (describing that the government used military
decrees to criminalize human rights activists).
183. See STEVEN A. COOK, RULING BUT NOT GOVERNING: THE MILITARY AND
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT, ALGERIA, AND TURKEY 72 (2007) (depicting
Ibrahim’s charge and prosecution).
184. See id. (describing Ibrahim’s election rights work).
185. See id. (detailing the various politically motivated charges against
Ibrahim).
186. See id. (noting an uptick in arrests against anyone opposing the regime).
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ordinary and military courts.187 In detention, many were subjected
to abuse and torture.188
Egypt’s human rights violations are no secret. Much has been
written about authoritarianism in the Middle East and failed
attempts both by domestic and international actors to democratize
the region and hold Middle Eastern regimes to their human rights
commitments.189 These failures are partly due to Western nations’
continuation of foreign aid to dictators notwithstanding stated
human rights conditions on aid, including $41 billion to Egypt in
security-related assistance since 1979.190
Rather than focus on how the U.S. facilitates human rights
violations abroad, I now turn to America’s counterterrorism laws,
policies and practices to demonstrate how counterterrorism
coordination may have contributed to authoritarian norms and
practices in the Middle East infecting U.S. counterterrorism
practices. The systematic use of torture in secret black sites and at
Guantanamo prison, inhumane conditions of detention, mass
surveillance, and selective enforcement of counterterrorism
against Muslim political dissidents are troublingly similar to
Egypt’s authoritarian practices, as is the justification for rights
violations—national security.191
187. See id. (detailing that charges were brought in the interest of national
security).
188. See supra notes 159–173 and accompanying text (detailing the Egyptian
regime’s torture of prisoners).
189. See supra notes 150–165 (providing an overview of various human rights
abuses).
190. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., SECURITY ASSISTANCE: U.S.
GOVERNMENT SHOULD STRENGTHEN END-USE MONITORING AND HUMAN RIGHTS
VETTING FOR EGYPT 1 (2016) (“Since the signing of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty
in 1979, the United States has provided Egypt with about $41 billion in
security-related assistance, making Egypt one of the top recipients of such
assistance in the world.”). Former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry asked
Congress to grant Egypt a waiver to the Human Rights Vetting Law (the Leahy
Law) that otherwise prohibited aid to nations in gross violation of human rights.
At the time, the Egyptian military led a coup ousting democratically elected
Mohamed Morsi and killed hundreds of protesters in Rabi’a Square. Nicole
Gaouette, U.S. Seeks to Roll Back Human Rights Conditions on Egypt Aid, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2016/02/26/politics/egypt-u-s-aid-kerry-military-humanrights/index.html (last updated Feb. 26, 2016) (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
191. See HERMAN, supra note 3, at 177 (depicting U.S. counterterrorism
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C. The Authoritarianization Effect on United States
Counterterrorism
Although much ink has been spilled critiquing the United
States’ human rights violations abroad and civil liberties
infringements at home since 9/11, little is written on the
relationship between United States-Middle East counterterrorism
coordination and rights infringements in the United States.192 In
the years immediately following the September 11th terrorist
attacks, two themes predominated U.S. rhetoric on national
security. First, the United States would do whatever was
necessary to bring to justice the perpetrators of the September
11th attacks in the “Global War on Terror.”193 This entailed
working with dictators in the Middle East as partners to fight a
war on terrorism.194 Second, the United States would promote
democracy in the Middle East and South Asia to eliminate the
repressive political conditions that some believed spawned
terrorism.195 This neoconservative agenda was a remnant of the
United States’ Cold War global politics.196 The contradiction
methods noting that the United States conducts detention and surveillance in the
interest of national security).
192. Some readers may mistakenly interpret my thesis as perpetuating
Orientalism by implying that the Middle East is hopelessly authoritarian and
thereby inferior to the West. To the contrary, I have written on the pivotal role
that Western nations have played in propping up dictatorships in the Middle East
to serve their geopolitical and economic interests. See generally SAHAR AZIZ &
ABDULLAH MUSALEM, CITIZENS, NOT SUBJECTS: DEBUNKING THE SECTARIAN
NARRATIVE OF BAHRAIN’S PRO-DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT (2011). Hence, in some ways
my thesis here argues there is a boomerang effect wherein dictatorial practices
arising from Western imperialism is now infiltrating Western democracies in part
as a result of counterterrorism coordination and international efforts to fight the
so-called “War on Terror.”
193. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 86, at iii (noting that the United
States must be prepared for a long campaign against terrorism).
194. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 108, at 4 (“U.S. efforts
with partners are central to achieving our [counterterrorism] goals, and we are
committed to building security partnerships even as we recognize and work to
improve shortfalls in our cooperation with partner nations.”).
195. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 4
(2002) (“We will speak out honestly about violations of the nonnegotiable
demands of human dignity using our voice and vote in international institutions
to advance freedom.”).
196. See generally CONDOLEEZZA RICE, DEMOCRACY: STORIES FROM THE LONG
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between a war model and democracy promotion for countering
terrorism was glaring.
On the one hand, President Bush wanted unfettered discretion
to do whatever he deemed necessary, including torture and
assassination, to fight an open-ended war against an ambiguously
defined enemy. On the other hand, he wanted to promote
democracy and strengthen civil society in Muslim majority
countries where international terrorists recruited and set up
bases.197 Obama continued his predecessor’s militarized
counterterrorism practices but paid more rhetorical homage to
human rights as he dropped the use of “War on Terror” in official
U.S. documents.198 While the importance of democratic and
representative governance was recognized in multiple U.S.
National Security Strategy documents under Obama, his
Administration deprioritized democracy promotion programs.199
The result was a schizophrenic flip-flopping between the
development
and
ideological
schools
of
thought
in
counterterrorism.
1. Rights Promoting Rhetoric
Both the Bush and Obama Administrations rhetorically
promoted human rights, civil rights, and civil liberties in
counterterrorism strategy. On multiple occasions, Bush stated
America was not at war with Islam.200 Bush’s 2006 National
ROAD TO FREEDOM (2017).
197. See supra Part III.B (discussing the U.S. democracy promotion agenda
post-9/11).
198. See Paul D. Shinkman, Obama: ‘Global War on Terror’ Is Over, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 23, 2013, 3:30 PM), https://www.usnews.com/
news/articles/2013/05/23/obama-global-war-on-terror-is-over (last visited Sept.
10, 2018) (noting Obama’s shift in rhetoric on the global war on terror) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
199. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
35– 36 (2010) (stating that America would not impose any system of government
on another country); Byman & Moller, supra note 48, at 281–82 (listing the
reasons for the failure of the U.S. democracy promotion agenda).
200. See Backgrounder: The President’s Quotes on Islam, THE WHITE HOUSE,
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/ramadan/islam.html (last
visited Sept. 10, 2018) (documenting President Bush’s remarks on Islam) (on file
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Security Strategy states “[n]ot only do we fight our terrorist
enemies on the battlefield, we promote freedom and human dignity
as alternatives to the terrorists’ perverse vision of oppression and
totalitarian rule.”201 The ultimate goal of the War on Terror is “to
help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can
meet the needs of their citizens . . . this is the best way to provide
enduring security for the American people . . . for the misrule of
tyrants at home leads to instability abroad.”202 Likewise, Obama
began his first term with a historic speech in Cairo where he
declared that the war on terrorism is not a war on Islam and “no
system of government can or should be imposed on one nation by
another.”203
To fight the War on Terror, however, the United States needed
cooperation from Middle Eastern governments—all of which were
authoritarian to varying degrees.204 Both the Bush and Obama
Administrations sought to expand international partnerships in
U.S. counterterrorism efforts. In its priority to defeat Al Qaeda and
then ISIS, the United States committed to “underwrite global
security—through our commitments to allies, partners, and
institutions.”205 But the U.S. government knew that an
authoritarian regime would not share intelligence, provide sites for
extraordinary rendition, torture U.S. terrorist suspects, accept
U.S. military bases, and otherwise assist in the War on Terror if
its existence was threatened by democratization programs.206 The
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
201. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATTING
TERRORISM 1 (2006).
202. Id. In furtherance of this policy, the Bush Administration committed
funds for economic assistance, development aid, trade, and good governance in
the Millennium Challenge that rewards countries with demonstrated democratic
reforms. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 21–22
(2002).
203. See President Barack Obama, Speech at Cairo University: A New
Beginning (June 4, 2009) (“In Ankara, I made clear that America is not—and
never will be—at war with Islam.”).
204. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 24
(2010) (noting the need for cooperation with Israel, Iraq, and the Palestinian
people).
205. Id. at 1.
206. See BYMAN, supra note 18, at 53–54 (noting that the U.S. depended on
these regimes for critical counterterrorism operations).
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regimes gladly took the military and economic aid without making
serious efforts to liberalize their political systems.207 By the end of
Obama’s Administration, the United States’ promotion of
democracy was no longer taken seriously.
At the same time the United States stated its adherence to
“respecting human rights, fostering good governance, respecting
privacy and civil liberties, committing to security and
transparency, and upholding the rule of law,” its Middle East
partners received billions of dollars in military weapons,
sometimes used against their own citizens.208 The 2015 National
Security Strategy admitted that despite America’s vision for a
peaceful and prosperous Middle East, “nowhere is the violence
more tragic and destabilizing than in the sectarian conflict from
Beirut to Baghdad, which has given rise to new terrorist groups
such as ISIL.”209 Many of the laws and practices authorized under
Bush continued under Obama.210 The increased coordination
between nations resulted in direct U.S. involvement in human
rights violations, including against its own citizens.211
The contradictions between rights infringing practices and
rhetorical commitments to democracy and human rights
discredited the United States both internationally and
domestically.212 The United States had compromised its fidelity to
international human rights norms.213
207. See id. (noting that providing aid did not bring regimes in line with
human rights norms).
208. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM 4 (2011); see Mark Landler & Steve Lee Myers, With $30
Billion Arms Deal, U.S. Bolsters Saudi Ties, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/30/world/middleeast/with-30-billion-arms-dealunited-states-bolsters-ties-to-saudi-arabia.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2018)
(outlining the weapons deal with the Saudi Royal Air Force) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
209. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1, at 26.
210. See, e.g., Amos N. Guiora, Due Process and Counterterrorism, 26 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 163, 170 (2012) (arguing that Obama reinstated trials before
Military Commissions at Guantanamo).
211. See SAID, supra note 124, at 24–26 (discussing the NYPD’s mapping and
mass surveillance of Muslims in the tri-state area).
212. See PLESSIS, supra note 3, at 31–32 (noting that cooperation practices
ignored due process protections).
213. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 10
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2. The Normalization of Torture and Indefinite Detention
The divergence between rights-supporting rhetoric and
rights-infringing practices is due in large part to the adoption of
the war model to counterterrorism—the same template
historically adopted by authoritarian Middle East regimes.214 One
Department of Justice (DOJ) official forthrightly stated, “The
United States cannot afford to retreat to a pre-September 11
mindset that treats terrorism solely as a domestic law enforcement
problem.”215 Consequently, terrorism is treated as an act of war
rather than a criminal act.216 By claiming the nation is facing an
existential threat, the government justifies military and police
actions that systemically violate human rights.217 It also accepts
theories that terrorism is caused by ideology as opposed to
socioeconomic underdevelopment and material deprivation.218
The counterterrorism war model blurs the line between police
and military functions. Targets are unlawful combatants instead
of criminal suspects.219 Due process rights afforded in ordinary
criminal procedures do not apply.220 Executive authorities resist
judicial review of surveillance, investigative techniques, and
interrogation. Selective targeting of suspects is infected by
(2010) (stating that certain security measures sacrificed human rights norms).
214. See CRELINSTEN, supra note 26, at 93–94 (detailing the historical Middle
Eastern counterterrorism model). See generally Authorization for Use of Military
Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
215. Adam Liptak, In War of Vague Borders, Detainee Longs for Court, N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
5,
2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/05/washington/
05terror.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
216. See CRELINSTEN, supra note 26, at 72–73 (explaining that terrorism
receives unique treatment); JENNIFER ELSEA, TERRORISM AND THE LAW OF WAR:
TRYING TERRORISTS AS WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE MILITARY COMMISSIONS 10 (Dec.
2001) (“A terrorist act is not seen as an act of war unless it is part of a broader
campaign of violence directed at the state.”).
217. See CRELINSTEN, supra note 26, at 79 (explaining the prioritization of
national security).
218. See id. (detailing the government’s explanation for terrorism).
219. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (outlining the targeting of
terrorist suspects).
220. See CRELINSTEN, supra note 26, at 86 (distinguishing terrorists’
prosecution from criminal prosecution).
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stereotypes and prejudice against groups deemed collectively
dangerous merely because they share the same religion or ideology
as suspected terrorists.221
The war model also grants the executive branch an
open-ended mandate to fight whomever is deemed an enemy of the
state.222 If left unchecked, such powers can be unleashed against
political dissidents and opposition under the guise of national
security.223 Torture is legalized and systemic, civilians are tried in
military courts, ordinary criminal offenses are prosecuted as
terrorism, and infringements on civil liberties become the
norm—as is the case in Egypt and other authoritarian allies.224
Ultimately, the rule of law is undermined.
The proliferation of black site detention centers and rampant
torture are among the gravest consequences of U.S.
counterterrorism. In violation of the Convention on Enforced
Disappearances, the Convention Against Torture, the universal
human right to personal liberty, and the prohibition of arbitrary
arrest and detention, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its
foreign counterparts covertly abducted individuals to secret
locations in the Middle East, North Africa, and other countries
where torture has long been a standard practice.225 Hundreds of
221. See Nicolas Brooklier, Islamophobia: The Stereotyping and Prejudice
Towards Muslims Since 9/11, WASH. ST. U. (Dec. 17, 2015),
https://hub.wsu.edu/law-justice-realtime/2015/12/17/islamophobia-the-stereotypingand-prejudice-towards-muslims-since-911/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2018)
(discussing that since 9/11, Muslims have been stereotyped and have been feared
as a group merely due to their religion and culture) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
222. See Jack R. Greene & Sergio Herzog, The Implications of Terrorism on
the Formal and Social Organization of Policing in the US and Israel: Some
Concerns and Opportunities, in TO PROTECT AND TO SERVE: POLICING IN AN AGE OF
TERRORISM 146 (David Weisburd et al. eds., 2009) (discussing how the War Model
allows for more extreme force normally not permitted by the government due to
the increasing strength, danger, and level of violence applied by terrorists).
223. See John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting “Enduring
Freedom” for “Homeland Security”: A Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot
Act and the Justice System’s Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081,
1093 (2002) (arguing that amendments to the Patriot Act may sweep too broadly).
224. See PLESSIS, supra note 3, at 35–36 (arguing for a criminal justice
approach to terrorism). See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “NO BLOOD, NO
FOUL”: SOLDIERS’ ACCOUNTS OF DETAINEE ABUSE IN IRAQ (2006).
225. See Setty, supra note 2, at 653 (detailing that post 9/11, the CIA set up a
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individuals, predominantly of Arab and Central Asian origin, were
extra-judicially delivered to interrogators in Egypt, Jordan, Syria,
and other countries where detainees were systematically abused
and tortured.226
The extraordinary rendition program was a complex and
coordinated program between the United States and its foreign
allies, authorized at the highest level of the Bush
Administration.227 According to UK parliamentary reports, over
twenty countries participated in the rendition program.228 Some
directly participated in torture while others provided airports,
airspace, and military bases for staging and stopover flights
carrying detainees.229 Victims of extraordinary rendition were not
limited to citizens of Middle Eastern countries, but also included
Canadian, German, and American citizens, most of whom were
Muslim.230 Children as young as thirteen and adults as old as
eighty-four were among those detained and tortured.231
After years of denial, investigative journalism forced the Bush
Administration to confirm extraordinary rendition was occurring.
But instead of stopping the program, the Administration legalized
torture by renaming it “enhanced interrogation,” and proclaiming
national security justified the practice.232 Government officials
network of black sites abroad to capture, detain, and interrogate suspected
terrorists).
226. See DUFFY, supra note 13, at 808 (describing the secrecy of the
extraditions). See generally Joint Study on Global Practices in Relation to Secret
Detention, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/42 (2010).
227. See Ariane de Vogue, Classified Detainee Memos at Center of Legal War,
ABC NEWS (Apr. 9, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/LawPolitics/story
?id=4620002&page=1 (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (discussing President Bush’s
Presidential Memorandum of Notice signed September 17, 2001, which
authorized extraordinary rendition) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). See generally Jane Mayer, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE
WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008).
228. See generally Intelligence and Security Committee, Rendition (2007).
229. Countries involved in extraordinary rendition in various ways included
Afghanistan, Lithuania, Morocco, Poland, Romania, Thailand, Egypt, Jordan,
and Syria. See Duffy, supra note 13, at 786–87.
230. See DUFFY, supra note 13, at 670–71 (detailing the wide reach of the
rendition program).
231. See generally id.
232. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S.
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pointed to legal memos issued in 2002 and 2003 by the Office of
Legal Counsel at the U.S. Department of Justice advising that
individuals suspected of membership in Al Qaeda are not protected
by international law, including prohibitions against torture.233
Even if they were protected, the DOJ argued, only treatment that
caused “injury so severe that death, organ failure, or permanent
damage resulting in a loss of significant bodily function” met the
U.S. legal threshold for torture.234
As a result, approved interrogation techniques included
[W]hipping by the neck into concrete walls; chaining to a chair
for a period of weeks; the use of the ‘box’, including forcing into
a small box for up to eighteen hours; stripping and hanging
naked from the ceiling; sleep deprivation, including keeping
detainees awake for eleven consecutive days; exposure to
extreme noise; exposure to cold until the victim turned blue;
denial of pain medication for injuries; waterboarding or
simulated drowning; and threats of imminent death.235

Conditions of detention were equally severe. Detainees were
hooded to disorient them and to keep them from learning their
location or the layout of the detention facility; shackled to chairs;
placed in solitary confinement for years; and subjected to
continuous noise and light.236 Detainees were cramped in small
unsanitary rooms and subjected to extreme heat.237 Such
treatment was legally justified by necessity and self-defense.238
Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, U.S. Dep’t. of
Justice 4 (Aug. 1, 2002) (concluding that violating torture laws requires specific
intent) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); DAVID COLE, THE
TORTURE MEMOS: RATIONALIZING THE UNTHINKABLE 2–7 (2009) (analyzing six
Justice Department memos on torture).
233. See Setty, supra note 2, at 668 (“Those memos were subsequently
rescinded, and several members of the military were convicted at courts-martial
for detainee abuse.”).
234. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 232,
at 13.
235. DUFFY, supra note 13, at 784.
236. See generally Joint Study on Global Practices in Relation to Secret
Detention, supra note 226.
237. DUFFY, supra note 13, at 673.
238. See Memorandum from Steve G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Cent.
Intelligence Agency 3 (July 20, 2007) (discussing the President’s ability to
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The torture and abuse of detainees in the United States’
extraordinary rendition program was systemic and unprecedented.
Some individuals were detained in secret locations for three or
more years incommunicado.239 Many were subjected to
waterboarding, including as frequently as a hundred times in a
single month.240 Others were interrogated for eighteen to twenty
hours a day for more than fifty consecutive days.241 One Ethiopian
citizen was detained for over a year and a half during which his
interrogators repeatedly sliced his genitals with razor blades and
poured stinging hot liquid on his open wounds.242 A Canadian
citizen of Syrian origin, Maher Arar, was mistakenly suspected of
ties with terrorists, arrested by U.S. officials in transit home to
Canada, and sent to Syria where he endured prolonged torture and
other brutal forms of interrogation.243
After weeks, months, or years of secret coercive interrogation,
when interrogators determined there was no intelligence value in
a detainee, he was sent to Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, and
other prisons where torture was commonplace.244 In Abu Ghraib,
U.S. military and intelligence officials systematically subjected
detainees to physical and sexual abuse, torture, rape, sodomy, and
interpret the Geneva Convention by executive order) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
239. See DUFFY, supra note 13, at 807–08 (describing how detainees were not
able to call family or attorneys).
240. Extraordinary Rendition, Extraterritorial Detention, and Treatment of
Detainees,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(July
25,
2007,
8:00
PM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2007/07/25/extraordinary-rendition-extraterritorialdetention-and-treatment-detainees (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (describing
enhanced interrogation at CIA black sites) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
241. See DUFFY, supra note 13, at 598–99 (noting that interrogation
techniques were meant to exhaust detainees).
242. See R (on the application of Binyam Mohamed) v. Sec’y of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2010], EWCA Civ 65 [124] (UK) (noting that
the prisoner was also deprived of sleep and food).
243. See Hafner-Burton & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 417 (noting that
authoritarian regimes permit U.S. rendition for intelligence purposes).
244. See Khalili, supra note 3, at 80–81 (arguing the racialized manipulation
of law in the war on terror resulted in the Supreme Courts’ denial of relief to
Maher Arar notwithstanding the U.S.’s direct role in sending him to be tortured
based on false intelligence).
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murder.245 The few detainees set free were denied reparation or a
public apology.246
When news broke in 2004 of widespread torture at the hands
of U.S. intelligence and military officials, Americans were
surprised to learn that the White House and DOJ authorized the
torture. Pressure mounted on Congress to pass the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 that prohibited abuse and torture of
detainees.247 In 2009, President Obama issued an executive order
banning “enhanced interrogation techniques” and limited
interrogation techniques to those authorized under the Army Field
Memo.248 The Military Commissions Act of 2009 and Defense
Authorization Bill of 2015 legislated the order into law.249
In contrast to Middle East authoritarian countries, the United
States has a vibrant civil society and cadre of independent
investigative journalists. As a result, the nation’s drift toward
authoritarianism was structurally constrained by a group of
courageous lawyers, activists, and journalists.250 Nevertheless, the
U.S. War on Terror contributed to the normalization of torture.
Indeed, lawyers from the most elite law schools manipulated
interpretations of the law to legalize torture.251 that no high-level
245. See generally Alette Smeulers & Sander Niekirk, Abu Ghraib and the
War on Terror—A Case Against Donald Romsfeld?, 51 CRIME, L., & SOC. CHANGE
327 (2008).
246. See HERMAN, supra note 3, at 203–04 (discussing the case of Khaled
el-Masri).
247. See Mayer, supra note 99 (reporting torture practices leading up to 2005).
248. See generally COLE, supra note 232 (providing a thorough assessment of
the legal analysis underlying the six memos authorizing torture by U.S. officials).
249. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No.
111–84, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009); Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, 128 Stat.
3292 (2015).
250. See generally AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ACLU STATEMENT ON TEN
YEARS OF GUANTANAMO (2018); CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, REPORT ON
TORTURE AND CRUEL, INHUMAN, AND DEGRADING TREATMENT OF PRISONERS AT
GUANTANAMO BAY (2006).
251. See OFFICE OF PROF. RESP., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION INTO
THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S USE OF “ENHANCED INTERROGATION
TECHNIQUES” ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 251–59 (2009) (documenting individuals
involved in the “Torture Memos”).
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official involved in the torture program has been prosecuted is
further proof that torture is an acceptable national security
practice under certain circumstances.252 Indeed, should there be
another major terrorist attack on U.S. soil, the Trump
Administration admitted that torture is an option it would
consider.253
Along with torture came indefinite detention. Hundreds of
detainees from black sites were transferred to Guantanamo Bay,
Abu Ghraib, and Bagram Air Base where they were denied basic
due process rights in violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention,
among other laws.254 In Guantanamo Bay, where most detainees
suspected of being associated with Al Qaeda were sent, the Bush
Administration intentionally sought to evade legal protections
afforded by U.S. and international human rights laws by labeling
them “unlawful enemy combatants.”255
A Presidential Military Order authorizing indefinite detention
declared that
[T]he individual shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or
maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any
such remedy or proceeding sought on the individual’s behalf, in
(i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any
court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal.256

Labeled “enemy combatants” based on secret evidence, the
detainees were denied access to lawyers or their families, and could
252. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO MORE EXCUSES: A ROADMAP TO JUSTICE
CIA TORTURE 23 (2016) (noting that the highest-ranking officer prosecuted
was a lieutenant colonel).
253. See Dan Merica, Trump on Waterboarding: ‘We Have to Fight Fire
with Fire’,
CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politics/donald-trumpwaterboarding-torture/index.html (last updated Jan. 26, 2017) (last visited Sept.
10, 2018) (reporting that the Administration would consider enhanced
interrogation techniques) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
254. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (outlining minimum
requirements for treatment of prisoners); CRELINSTEN, supra note 26, at 48–49
(documenting various rights violations of detainees abroad).
255. See Setty, supra note 2, at 660 (describing that this strategy provided a
way to send detainees to military court).
256. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terror, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,835–36 (Nov. 13, 2001).
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not petition for independent review of their detention.257 To protest
their indefinite detention, prisoners attempted to commit suicide
and undertook in months-long hunger strikes.258
Without investigative reporting followed by years of
contentious litigation that reached the U.S. Supreme Court, this
system of indefinite detention in a lawless zone could have
remained secret and unchecked.259 In a series of cases starting in
2004, the Supreme Court held that U.S. citizens designated as
unlawful enemy combatants by the executive branch still had a
right for their detention to be challenged before a neutral
arbiter.260 Justice O’Connor warned the executive branch that
“[w]e have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank
check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s
citizens.”261 The Court also held that non-U.S. citizens held in
Guantanamo Bay had a right to habeas corpus where they could
challenge their detention before regular Article III courts.262 In
response, the United States sent captured detainees to Bagram Air
Force Base outside of U.S. courts’ jurisdiction.263
The limited due process afforded by habeas petitions revealed
many detainees were innocent victims of local bounty hunters.264
257. See Whitehead & Aden, supra note 223, 1117–18 (noting that detainees
were discouraged or blocked from seeking counsel). The United States used the
same legal arguments in the early 1990s when it refused Haitian asylum seekers
access to the press or lawyers and due process rights, and disavowed U.S.
sovereignty over Guantanamo. KHALILI, supra note 3, at 76–77.
258. See Setty, supra note 2, at 664–65 (stating that the strikes led to
force-feeding prisoners); Guantanamo: Facts and Figures, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar.
30, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/interactive/2017/03/30/guantanamofacts-and-figures (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (reporting that six detainees
committed suicide) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
259. See HERMAN, supra note 3, at 203–04 (noting the impact of the litigation).
260. See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
261. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536.
262. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771 (“We hold that Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the
Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.”).
263. See Setty, supra note 2, at 664 (noting that detainees have no habeas
rights at the base).
264. See, e.g., David Cole, Where Liberty Lies: Civil Society and Individual
Rights After 9/11, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 1203, 1267 (2011) (arguing that civil society
groups served reinforced the checking function of constitutional and international

U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM

1619

Contrary to U.S. government claims, many detainees were
civilians kidnapped by local warlords in Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and Iraq to be delivered to the U.S. military in exchange for a
bounty.265 Never having posed a threat to the United States, they
lost years of their lives and suffered severe mental and physical
health problems due to torture and prolonged detention.266 Those
who filed human rights claims in U.S. courts were impeded by the
state secret privilege, which granted the executive immunity for
violating international law.267
After years of advocacy and revelations of a pattern of human
rights violations, the Obama Administration finally announced it
would close the Guantanamo Bay prison and prosecute detainees
in U.S. federal courts.268 But congressional leaders obstructed
these efforts by passing a law prohibiting any detainee transfers
to U.S. soil, in part, because defendants’ access to due process
might result in their acquittal.269 Over seventeen years after
September 11th, Guantanamo Bay remains a destination for
suspected terrorists captured abroad by U.S. officials seeking to
evade international human rights law and U.S. domestic law.270 A
practice that used to be considered within the realm of

law through litigation and advocacy).
265. See, e.g., Egypt: 7,400 Civilians Tried in Military Court, supra note 150
(documenting cases of systemic torture by the Egyptian security services).
266. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOCKED UP ALONE: DETENTION CONDITIONS
AND MENTAL HEALTH AT GUANTANAMO 20 (2008) (reporting insomnia,
hallucinations, and psychosis in detainees).
267. See Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
77, 87 (2010) (stating that the government invoked state secret privilege in over
100 cases).
268. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Plan to Close
the Prison at Guantanamo Bay (Feb. 23, 2016) (stating that the detention facility
undermines, not promotes, national security). But see SAID, supra note 124, at
113–14 (arguing that U.S. federal courts are highly deferential to prosecutors and
go out of their way to ensure convictions of terrorism suspects).
269. See CRELINSTEN, supra note 26, at 49 (detailing the law as part of the
National Defense Authorization Act).
270. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, GUANTÁNAMO BY THE NUMBERS 1 (2018)
(providing an overview of the number of detainees over the last three
administrations).
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authoritarian regimes has now become an openly American
practice.271
The authoritarianization of U.S. counterterrorism did not end
with torture and indefinite detention abroad.272 At home,
Americans’ civil liberties fall prey to the prying eyes of a
burgeoning surveillance state.273
3. Establishing a Surveillance State and Selective
Counterterrorism Enforcement
Technological advancements, the rise of international
terrorism, and normalization of authoritarian practices prove
ominous for domestic civil liberties.274 Gathering intelligence and
mass surveillance to justify ex ante, pre-crime objectives became
bureaucratized in what Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson call the
“National Surveillance State.”275 Multiple covert programs collect
information from a wide range of government and private
databases to produce mammoth amounts of personal data at the
fingertips of law enforcement.276
Soon after the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration secretly
authorized a program known as Total Information Awareness
(TIA).277 The program collected information from government and
271. See id. (reporting that the United States has held 780 detainees at
Guantanamo).
272. See DUFFY, supra note 13, at 636–37 (describing U.S. surveillance
techniques).
273. See id. (discussing that surveillance sacrifices citizens’ privacy).
274. See generally INT’L CAMPAIGN AGAINST MASS SURVEILLANCE, THE
EMERGENCE OF A GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR MASS REGISTRATION AND
SURVEILLANCE (2005); Whitehead & Aden, supra note 223.
275. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional
Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 520–21 (2006).
276. See Margaret Hu, Taxonomy of the Snowden Disclosures, 72 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1679, 1689–91 (2015) (providing a comprehensive list of the various big
data and small data programs that buttress the national security state); Steven
R. Morrison, The System of Domestic Counterterrorism Law, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 341, 345 (2014) (listing the Total Information Awareness system, Multistate
Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange, and Disposition Matrix as a few of the
aggregators of mass surveillance).
277. See Morrison, supra note 276, at 345 (describing the use of TIA in New
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private databases about Americans’ transactions, and then applied
algorithms to the data as a means of identifying terrorist
patterns.278 This form of predictive policing looked at financial,
educational, travel, medical, housing, and other transactions to
target individuals as potential terrorists.279 Rather than focusing
on individualized suspicion or predicate acts of terrorism, the
government adopted a risk-assessment model.280 People deemed to
be of higher risk levels would then be targeted for investigation
and prosecution.281 Applying the ideological causation theory, the
risk criteria were closely associated with religious beliefs,
associations, and political activities of Muslims and Arabs. 282
Traveling to the Middle East, transferring money to family
abroad, donating to Muslim charities, associating with people from
the Middle East, studying Arabic, doing business with other
Muslims, and regularly attending mosques also triggered
government suspicion and surveillance.283 As these minority
groups become increasingly scrutinized by the state, stereotypes of
the Muslim terrorist that animate government surveillance are
reinforced and intensified against Muslim communities.284 The
predictive, risk-assessment model facilitates racial and religious
profiling of Muslims and Arabs based on an interpretation of
ordinary activities as ideologically associated with Islam.285
Although public and congressional pushback ultimately ended
the TIA, the Bush Administration secretly authorized another
York City).
278. See id. (detailing that law enforcement uses the program to find patterns
of terrorist planning).
279. See id. (stating that the data comes from informants, undercover agents,
and wiretaps).
280. See id. (noting that the data often provides enough to make an arrest).
281. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 13, at 5–8 (discussing how
biometric data is used to target individuals).
282. See Aziz, supra note 103, at 482 (arguing that the focus on religion led to
misinterpretation of Islamic practices as indicia of terrorism).
283. See SAID, supra note 124, at 102–04 (detailing activity that was captured
in surveillance methods).
284. See Morrison, supra note 276, at 344 (explaining the disparate impact on
Muslims of the feedback loop created by social network surveillance programs).
285. See Aziz, supra note 103, at 488 (arguing that Muslims are perceived as
terrorists in waiting instead of ordinary citizens).
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version of the program wherein the National Security Agency spied
on people in the United States, including American citizens, who
communicated with persons outside the country.286 Without a court
order, the NSA secretly intercepted tens of millions of telephone
calls and emails and stored them in massive databases.287
Breaking from the standard law enforcement practice of long term
monitoring of select individuals based on individualized suspicion,
the U.S. government was now collecting massive amounts of data
on hundreds of thousands of individuals that could be mined at any
time.288 Although the contents of the conversations were not
retained, the metadata collected—e.g., time, location, duration, to
and from phone numbers and emails—gave the government a
window into a person’s activities and associations.289
Another
program,
PRISM,
gathered
contents
of
communications from non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be
abroad even if the communication includes a U.S. citizen.290
Although these searches require a warrant from the secret Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, these broad warrants do not
identify the people or places searched or impose meaningful
restrictions on the collection, retention, or dissemination of the
foreign intelligence obtained.291
When the New York Times broke the story about these mass
surveillance programs, the Bush Administration pointed to the
286. See HERMAN, supra note 3, at 166 (noting surveillance on U.S. citizens);
see also Katherine L. Wong, The NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program, 43 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 517, 519 (2006) (stating that the NSA harvested large quantities of
data searching for terrorist patterns).
287. See generally Peter Margulies, Surveillance by Algorithm: The NSA,
Computerized Intelligence Collection, and Human Rights, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1045
(2016) (examining whether such surveillance violated the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights to which the U.S is a party).
288. See Wong, supra note 286, at 518–19 (“Surveillance activity . . . has
encompassed the communications of potentially thousands of Americans . . . .”).
289. See Setty, supra note 2, at 653 (discussing how the NSA defends the
collection under the Patriot Act).
290. See USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)
(allowing the government to obtain a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court to collect contents of information related to foreign
intelligence).
291. See HERMAN, supra note 3, at 172–73 (noting the ease of obtaining a
warrant).
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Patriot Act as authorizing its secret collection programs.292 A
300-page law hurriedly passed within forty-five days of the
September 11th attacks, the Patriot Act legalized expansive
government surveillance and investigative powers.293 Legal
standards restricting searches of email and telephone
communications were relaxed, as was government access to
medical, financial, and other personal records.294 For example, the
legal standard for obtaining a wiretap related to foreign
intelligence was loosened from probable cause of a crime to mere
relevancy to terrorism prevention.295 FISA warrants no longer had
to show that the primary purpose of the pertinent investigation
was to collect foreign intelligence, merely a significant purpose.296
Meanwhile, courts regularly deferred to FBI agents’ lax definitions
of significant purpose and relevancy.297
The relaxed standards likely contributed to the increased
number of FISA orders from 934 in 2001 to 2,370 in 2007.298 The
Patriot Act also authorized law enforcement officials to apply for
roving wiretaps on any communication service provider without
geographical limitations or naming the target.299 Pen registers and
292. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without
Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/
politics/bush-lets-us-spy-on-callers-without-courts.html?_r=0 (last visited Sept.
10, 2018) (reporting that the Bush Administration dismissed any civil liberties
concerns) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
293. See generally MICHAEL KRAFT & EDWARD MARKS, U.S. GOVERNMENT
COUNTERTERRORISM (2016); CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31377,
THE USA PATRIOT ACT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (2002).
294. See generally DOYLE, supra note 293.
295. See Whitehead & Aden, supra note 223, at 1106 (describing the “trap and
trace” orders).
296. See USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272,
291 (2001) (listing requirements for surveillance).
297. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, RECLAIMING PATRIOTISM 10 (2009)
(noting that the agency claimed there were no substantiated allegations of abuse).
See generally Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV.
1361 (2009) (discussing the courts’ tendency to defer to executive branch agencies
in national security cases).
298. See id. at 11 (including electronic surveillance and physical searches).
299. See USA Patriot Act of 2001, § 206 (amending the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act to authorize roaming wiretaps); Whitehead & Aden, supra note
223, at 1105 (discussing surveillance of unspecified persons instead of specific
communications providers).
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trap and trace orders applied anywhere in the United States rather
than within the jurisdiction of the ordering court.300 Sneak and
peak searches allowed law enforcement to conduct searches
without notice to the target.301
Secret warrants from a secret court permit federal authorities
to investigate U.S. citizens and residents based on factors
tangentially related to national security. Thus, warrants
authorized under Section 215 of the Patriot Act were especially
problematic.302 The type of information that could be obtained
expanded to “any tangible thing” on persons who were not
necessarily under suspicion for involvement in terrorism or
espionage.303 Information sought included library records, which
resulted in librarians across the country being served with Section
215 warrants and national security letters seeking the internet
and reading lists of patrons.304 Gag orders barred the librarians
from challenging or disclosing the requests for facially First
Amendment protected activity.305 Enlisting librarians in
counterterrorism was part of a broader system of delegating
intelligence collection to private and public local actors.
Deputizing citizens to spy on each other is another powerful
tool of authoritarian regimes for instilling fear and paranoia
among their citizens. 306 In the United States, state and local police
300. See USA Patriot Act of 2001 § 206 (amending the geographic limits of
surveillance).
301. See Whitehead & Aden, supra note 223, at 1083–84, 1111 (2002)
(outlining impositions on Americans’ freedoms).
302. See id. at 1111 (arguing that the law led to warrants served against
innocent individuals).
303. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 297, at 14 (noting the
significant expansion of government authority).
304. See id. (describing Section 215 as the “library provision”).
305. See id. (“Section 215 orders come with compulsory non-disclosure orders,
or ‘gags,’ which contributed to the secrecy surrounding how they were being
used.”); HERMAN, supra note 3, at 122, 126 (noting that 137 librarians had been
asked by federal, state, and local law enforcement for information about their
patrons between October 2001 and June 2005).
306. See Watchdog: Syria, China, Iran and Bahrain Spy on Their Citizens
Online the Most, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 12, 2013, 7:11 AM), http://www.business
insider.com/government-that-spy-on-their-citizens-2013-3 (last visited Sept. 10,
2018) (detailing regimes that use surveillance to fight dissent) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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manage state fusion centers that produce suspicious activity
reports with minimal oversight.307 The private sector assists
government intelligence collection through suspicious activity
reporting. In 2002, the Bush Administration initiated the
Terrorism Information and Prevention System (TIPS) wherein
truck drivers, utility workers, cable guys, banks, and other
businesses would report suspicious activity.308 TIPS invited racial
and ethnic profiling as citizens reported Muslims praying, wearing
headscarves, donning bears, and engaging in other religious
activities as suspicious terrorist activity.309 Consequently, the
number of suspicious activity reports skyrocketed from
approximately 163,000 in 2000 to 1.25 million in 2007.310 Banks
were also required to collect more information about their
customers, share it with the government, and err on the side of
inclusivity in submitting reports of suspicious transactions.311
Predictably, customers with family and businesses in the Middle
East and North Africa found themselves targets of heightened
bank scrutiny that led to sudden bank account closures, refusal of
service, and surprise visits by law enforcement.312
The most widely used method of government surveillance has
become the National Security Letter (NSL), an administrative
subpoena issued by the FBI to private entities for information
about their customers.313 No longer must the FBI show specific and
307. See Setty, supra note 2, at 652 (stating that the centers are meant to help
law enforcement synthesize information from communities).
308. See Establishing the USA Freedom Corps, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 2002),
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/freedomcorps-policy-book-05.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (noting how citizens can
contribute to homeland security) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
309. See HERMAN, supra note 3, at 90–91 (describing TIPS usage in the United
States).
310. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 297, at 12 (reporting that the
Patriot Act increased the number of financial institutions required to file reports).
311. See id. (“These reports include detailed personal and account information
and are turned over to the Treasury Department and the FBI.”).
312. See Bank Account Closures, ADC, http://www.adc.org/bank-accountclosures/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (“The financial institution often cites the
Patriot Act generally as the reason for the account closure.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
313. See National Security Letters, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR.,
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articulable facts that the target was a foreign power or agent of a
foreign power.314 Instead, the Patriot Act relaxes the standard to
mere relevance to a national security investigation.315 Because
NSLs are subpoenas, no court order is required prior to issuing
them.316
Unsurprisingly, issuance of NSLs surged. By 2006, the FBI
issued nearly 50,000 NSL requests to car rental companies, banks,
casinos, internet service providers, Google, Facebook, financial
institutions, libraries, and other businesses as compared to 8,500
in 2000.317 The DOJ Inspector General found that over 60% of
NSLs reviewed violated FBI internal controls and 22% violated
internal reporting requirements resulting in at least 3,000
violations.318
Most troublingly, the line between the FBI’s domestic
surveillance powers and the CIA’s international surveillance
powers is blurred.319 The CIA has had access to vast amounts of
personal information gathered by the FBI.320 Under the guise of
information sharing, the U.S. regressed back to an era when the
FBI and CIA engaged in egregious rights violations under the
infamous COINTELPRO of the 1960s and 1970s.321 During this
era, civil rights leaders, anti-war activists, and persons suspected
of being Communists were spied on, investigated, and in some
https://epic.org/privacy/nsl/#stats (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (documenting a
drastic increase in National Security Letters following the Patriot Act) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
314. See Andrew E. Nieland, National Security Letters and the Amended
Patriot Act, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1201, 1211 (2007) (noting that an agent can issue
an NSL if the information is relevant to an investigation).
315. See id. (stating that the Patriot Act eliminated the requirement of a
foreign connection).
316. See id. at 1209 (describing the NSL exception to court orders).
317. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 297, at 32 (noting that many
recipients are two or three times removed from a suspected terrorist).
318. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION’S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS 16–25 (2014) (providing
recommendations for compliance with internal regulations).
319. See Whitehead & Aden, supra note 223, at 1091–92, 1109 (noting
unprecedented CIA access to intelligence on U.S. citizens).
320. See id. at 1090–92 (detailing inter-agency information sharing).
321. See id. at 1109 (stating that Section 203(b) of the Patriot Act authorizes
agencies to share any communication intercepted under the Wiretap Act).
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cases, prosecuted.322 Tellingly, the FBI and CIA primarily targeted
African Americans, Jews, or leftists whose ideology and race were
deemed a threat to the state.323
The same is happening in the post-9/11 era as Muslim
students, businesses, mosques, and homes are subjected to
intensive surveillance for no other reason than their religion or
ethnic origin.324 Muslims are disproportionately on multiple watch
lists containing hundreds of thousands of names.325 Ranging from
No Fly Lists that preclude them from traveling by air altogether to
Terrorist Screening Lists that subject them to secondary screening
every time they travel, Muslims do not receive notice of their
selection nor are they offered meaningful opportunity to be
removed from these secret lists.326 Consequently, a large
percentage of names are false positives due to incorrect or outdated
information and mistaken identities.327 Over time, selective
enforcement of counterterrorism laws produces a palpable chilling
effect in Muslim American communities.328
As authoritarian norms seep into governance, government
scrutiny eventually shifts from politically vulnerable minorities
that serve as convenient scapegoats to political dissidents and
opposition groups.329 In a 2010 report, the Inspector General for
322. See id. at 1090–92 (discussing that the government reserved the right to
surveil religious groups and charitable organizations).
323. See id. at 1091–92 (noting the chilling effect on First Amendment
freedoms).
324. See, e.g., Dawinder S. Sidhu, The Chilling Effect of Government
Surveillance Programs on the Use of the Internet by Muslims-Americans, 7 U. MD.
L.J. RACE, RELIG., GENDER & CLASS 375, 376 (2007) (arguing that surveillance
disrupts ordinary life for Muslims).
325. See, e.g., DUFFY, supra note 13, at 88 (detailing that Muslim names
account for the majority of names on counterterrorism watch lists).
326. See HERMAN, supra note 3, at 71, 73 (discussing the secrecy behind
adding individuals to the watch lists).
327. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S TERRORIST WATCHLIST NOMINATION PRACTICES xxiii
(2009) (finding that nearly 24,000 identities in the consolidated watchlist were
associated with outdated or non-terrorism designations).
328. See generally TUFYAL CHOUDHURY & HELEN FENWICK, THE IMPACT OF
COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES ON MUSLIM COMMUNITIES (2011).
329. See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A
REVIEW OF THE FBI’S INVESTIGATIONS OF CERTAIN DOMESTIC ADVOCACY GROUPS
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the United States Department of Justice found that the FBI had
improperly targeted domestic advocacy groups for investigation
solely on account of their First Amendment protected activities.330
FBI agents secretly attended meetings, took pictures, and
gathered intelligence about anti-war, animal rights, and
anti-globalization meetings without a legitimate law enforcement
purpose.331 Confidential informants infiltrated the organizations
reporting back to the FBI on the organizations’ First Amendment
protected activities.332
V. Reversing the Race to the Bottom
These negative domestic externalities of counterterrorism
coordination are sufficiently serious that they can no longer be
ignored. Not only have laws and practices changed, but also a
culture of intolerance has arisen in American political culture.333
The effects were glaringly evident during the 2016 presidential
campaign. Republican candidates competed for who was most
hawkish on national security and immigration, which manifested
in scapegoating Muslims and equating Islam with terrorism.334
Calls to keep America safe included registering all Muslims in
the United States, barring Muslims from entering the country, and
surveilling mosques under the presumption that they are hotbeds
of terrorism.335 Government officials betrayed America’s historical
(2010) (reporting on the FBI’s treatment of five advocacy groups).
330. See id. at 59–70 (documenting FBI’s targeting and monitoring groups’
speech and assembly).
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. See generally Lawrence D. Bobo, Racism in Trump’s America, 68 BRIT. J.
SOC. 85 (2017) (outlining a new wave of racism following the 2016 campaign and
election).
334. See Jenna Johnson & Abigail Hauslohner, ‘I Think Islam Hates Us’: A
Timeline of Trump’s Comments About Islam and Muslims, WASH. POST (May 20,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/05/20/ithink-islam-hates-us-a-timeline-of-trumps-comments-about-islam-andmuslims/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ef514dcb42ca (last visited Sept. 10, 2018)
(discussing the Republicans’ defamatory language towards Islam and Muslims)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
335. See Greg Sargent, Paul Ryan Joins Barack Obama in Condemning
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commitment to granting refuge to civilians victimized by war
abroad as they called to ban Syrian refugees from entering the
United States.336 Then-presidential candidate Trump condemned
Syrian refugees as a collective security risk when he stated
[W]hen the Syrian refugees are going to start pouring into this
country, we don’t know if they’re ISIS, we don’t know if it’s a
Trojan horse. And I definitely want a database and other checks
and balances. We want to go with watch lists. We want to go
with databases. And we have no choice.337

The fear mongering and collective suspicion cast upon
minorities led to changes in laws that jeopardized their rights.338
In January 2017, for example, President Trump issued executive
orders banning citizens from seven Muslim majority countries
from entering the United States and indefinitely barring Syrian
refugees many of who were victims of terrorism themselves.339
When Acting Attorney General Sallie Yates refused to enforce the
ban on grounds that it was unconstitutional, Trump immediately
fired her.340 Similarly, Trump fired FBI Director James Comey
Anti-Muslim
Bigotry,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
8,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2015/12/08/paul-ryan-joinsbarack-obama-in-condemning-anti-muslim-bigotry/?utm_term=.3c12e1070812
(last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (demonstrating the polarizing views of the Trump
Administration) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). See generally
Sahar F. Aziz, A Muslim Registry: The Precursor to Internment?, 2018 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 101 (2018) (examining the legality of a special registration program
targeting Muslims).
336. See id. (noting politicians who expressed the need for a ban or did not
condemn a call for a ban).
337. Aaron Blake, Trump Says We’ve Known His Muslim Ban and Database
Plans ‘All Along.’ But We Still Don’t—Not Really, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/17/the-evolution-ofdonald-trump-and-the-muslim-database/?utm_term=.1e65950c16b2 (last visited
Sept. 10, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
338. See, e.g., Middle East Overview, MINORITY RTS. GROUP INT’L (Sept., 2012),
http://minorityrights.org/minorities/overview-of-middle-east/ (last visited Sept.
10, 2018) (discussing rights violations of minorities in Egypt and other middle
eastern countries) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
339. See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017) (invoking
authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act).
340. See Evan Perez & Jeremy Diamond, Trump Fires Acting AG After She
Declines
to
Defend
Travel
Ban,
CNN
(Jan.
31,
2017),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/30/politics/donald-trump-immigration-order-
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when he refused to pledge absolute loyalty to the president.341
Removing civil servants who do not blindly obey the president is a
frequent occurrence in authoritarian regimes.342
Just as the United States does not negotiate with terrorists,
neither should it coordinate counterterrorism operations with
state human rights violators. That Middle Eastern regimes’
authoritarian rights-infringing practices have made the region
more, not less, susceptible to terrorist violence should further
caution Western nations adopting similar practices.343 Indeed, the
region has the highest concentration of transnational terrorist
attacks causing over tens of thousands of civilians killed over the
past four decades.344
Financial restraints should be imposed on federal agencies
who coordinate with counterparts who violate rights in
counterterrorism. The United States has established the
promotion of internationally recognized human rights as a
component of its foreign policy.345 Toward that end, a pair of
amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the
National Defense Authorization Act, also known as the Leahy
Laws, prohibit the State and Defense Departments from giving
department-of-justice/index.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (detailing the acting
AG’s dismissal) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
341. See Michael D. Shear & Matt Apuzzo, FBI Director James Comey is Fired
by Trump, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/us/politics/jamescomey-fired-fbi.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (reporting on the political
consideration surrounding Comey’s firing) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
342. See Heba Afify, New Law Further Shields Government from
Accountability,
MADA,
https://www.madamasr.com/en/2015/07/12/feature/
politicsnew-law-further-shields-government-from-accountability/ (last updated
Jan. 31, 2017) (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (discussing how the President of Egypt
was able to pass a law, providing him with the power to remove immunized heads
of supervisory bodies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
343. See, e.g., Braithwaite & Li, supra note 26, at 283 (“[T]he Middle East has
the highest concentration of transnational terrorist incidents, with Europe
ranked second.”).
344. See id. at 294 (“[Policy makers] should invest more resources directed at
combating terrorist activities in countries located in hot-spot neighborhoods
because these represent countries that are highly likely to experience a sharp
increase in terrorist attacks in subsequent years.”).
345. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITMENTS
AND PLEDGES (2017).
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foreign aid to any unit of a security or military force of a foreign
country if that unit has committed gross human rights
violations.346 Financial restraints should be imposed on federal
agencies that coordinate with counterparts who violate rights in
counterterrorism.
Gross human rights are defined as including “torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged
detention without charges and trial, causing the disappearance of
persons by abduction and clandestine detention of those persons,
and other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security
of person.”347 Such conditions are intended to incentivize and deter
foreign security forces from committing human rights violations.348
With the increase in coordination in counterterrorism operations
between the U.S. and foreign security forces, such conditions
should not be limited to the behavior of foreign security forces. U.S.
security and intelligence officials must also be held accountable.
One way to do so is through budgetary and policy restraints.
Funding of government security agencies’ coordination or
cooperation with their foreign counterparts should be conditional
on their adherence to domestic civil rights and constitutional law
as well as international human rights law. While the means in
which such conditions can be incorporated into law is a separate
project beyond the scope of this Article, I proffer the following
conceptual framework: (1) reporting on counterterrorism
coordination; (2) monitoring of coordination to ensure U.S. officials
are not participating directly or indirectly in human rights
violations; and (3) conditioning funding of government agencies
engaged in transnational counterterrorism coordination. As the
overarching coordinator of intelligence and national security

346. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 620M, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2012); Carl
Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 1204(a)(1), 128 Stat. 3292, 3531 (2015).
347. 1961 Foreign Assistance Act § 116. Extrajudicial killing and politically
motivated rape are also included in this definition. See U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SECURITY ASSISTANCE 9 (2016).
348. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 347, at 8 (discussing
that the Leahy Laws prevent U.S. assistance to human rights violators).
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operations, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI) is a potential candidate as the implementing authority.349
First, agencies would be required to submit an annual report
to the ODNI about their counterterrorism coordination with
foreign governments in which they demonstrate that they are not
cooperating with counterparts that violate human rights.350 For
instance, when Afghan police and military units abuse and torture
detainees, the United States should not be cooperating with such
units, much less funding them.351 The same applies for FBI and
CIA agents or DOJ lawyers who work with foreign intelligence and
anti-terrorism counterparts.352 Not only do such restrictions
prevent violations against civilians abroad, but they also prevent
the long-term exposure of U.S. counterterrorism personnel to
authoritarian practices permissible under the foreign countries’
laws and policies. Such exposure contributes toward normalizing
these human rights violations within the American national
security community.
Second, the ODNI would monitor U.S. counterterrorism
coordination through review of the reports and auditing processes
to ensure compliance. The ODNI would have a similar role in
counterterrorism coordination human rights compliance as the

349. See
Who
We
Are,
OFF.
DIR.
NAT’L
INTELLIGENCE,
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/who-we-are (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (stating
that the ODNI serves as the head of the U.S. intelligence community) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
350. The agencies subject to this process should include the Department of
Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the Department of
Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Treasury, and the
National Security Agency.
351. See Jeremy Kelly, US-Backed Afghan Militias Accused of Human Rights
Abuses, GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2011, 3:53 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2011/sep/12/us-backed-afghan-militias-abuses (last visited Sept. 10, 2018)
(reporting U.S. support for the Afghan Local Police) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
352. See ‘We Left Our Most Important Prisoners To Amateurs’, SPIEGEL
ONLINE (Jan. 23, 2015, 4:06 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/
former-fbi-official-ali-soufan-condemns-guantanamo-torture-a-1014475.html
(last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (providing an interview with former FBI agent Ali
Soufan, which discusses the CIA using torture techniques after 9/11) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).

U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM

1633

State Department in enforcing compliance with the Leahy Laws in
the foreign aid context.353
Third, should an agency be found out of compliance, funding
for counterterrorism coordination should be suspended until the
agency takes effective measures to bring itself into compliance.354
This may include repealing memorandums of understanding for
cooperation with foreign units, cancellation of training programs,
and providing additional training to U.S. personnel on U.S. law
and international human rights law. Corrective measures for
noncompliance should be adopted with the goal of preventing
short-term human rights and civil rights violations and
longer-term compliance through a culture of democracy and
respect for individual rights.355
To be sure, implementation of human and civil rights
conditions will not be free of challenges.356 Information about U.S.
partners’ counterterrorism efforts may not always be available to
U.S. officials. Nor will documentation always be available to prove
U.S. compliance. Because what constitutes a violation must be
clearly defined and consistently applied, the proposed framework
353. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 347, at 10 (describing
the process in the State Department that monitors compliance with the Leahy
Laws).
354. This proposal is taken from the language in the Leahy amendment
stating:
No assistance shall be furnished under this Act or the Arms Export
Control Act to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the
Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed
gross violations of human rights. The prohibition in subsection (a) shall
not apply if the Secretary determines and reports to the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives, and the Committees on Appropriations
that the government of such country is taking effective measures to
bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 620(j), 22 U.S.C. § 2378(d) (2012).
355. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF GOOD POLICING: AVOIDING
VIOLENCE BETWEEN POLICE AND CITIZENS 23 (2003) (discussing the role of law
enforcement culture in promoting rights compliance among the police).
356. See Andrew M. Leonard, Getting the Leahy Law Right, FOREIGN AFF.
(June 29, 2017), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-06-29/gettingleahy-law-right (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (highlighting the flaws with
implementation of the Leahy law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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requires an iterative and inclusive process wherein the various
affected agencies participate in the process.
VI. Conclusion
The authoritarianization of U.S. counterterrorism spans
multiple administrations in the post-9/11 era. At the same time
that Western nations focus on the democratization of Muslim
majority countries, citizens in the West experience attrition in
their civil liberties.357 “Hard on terror” approaches where the
rulebook is figuratively thrown out the window are mistaken for
“smart” national security measures.358 National security is used to
justify rights violations, emergency law, prosecutions, and military
trials of civilians.
Those advocating for a development approach to terrorism
prevention are dismissed as naïve.359 Human rights and individual
freedoms are characterized as a luxury the West cannot afford to
preserve in the face of a transnational terrorist threat.360 These are
the same views long held by Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes
mired in political instability.
Although transnational counterterrorism is necessary for the
security of both West and Middle Eastern nations, the exchange of
information, skills, and strategy may be contributing towards a
normalization of illiberal practices among U.S. officials. Countries
such as Egypt with a higher rate of terrorism become the experts
advising their U.S. counterparts that violence and brutality is the
only effective means of preventing terrorism. Consequently, a
cultural transformation occurs within the U.S. law enforcement
and intelligence community that subordinates rights—particularly
357. See Piazza & Walsh, supra note 15, at 129 (noting that Western countries
face diminishing civil liberties).
358. See, e.g., Daniel L. Byman, Trump and the Next Terrorist Attack,
BROOKINGS (May 3, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/05/03/trumpand-the-next-terrorist-attack/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (arguing that harsh
Western rhetoric will lend support to terrorist groups) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
359. See Wolfendale, supra note 2, at 762 (describing how some view
advocates of the development approach).
360. See DUFFY, supra note 13, at 544, 567 (noting the United States denying
the relevance of international human rights law in the war on terror).
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of groups with the same religious or racial identity of the
terrorists—to militarized counterterrorism practices.
Although evidence of a causal link between rights violations
and counterterrorism coordination is far from conclusive, the
United States’ post-9/11 national security practices troublingly
mirror those frequently found in authoritarian states. Abuse of
detainees, torture, indefinite detention, mass surveillance, secret
courts, selective enforcement of criminal and immigration law
based on race and religion, and extrajudicial killings are some
obvious examples. The acculturation of American security officials
into an authoritarian, militaristic approach is more insidious and
rights infringing over the long run. As such, concrete
accountability measures on federal security and intelligence
agencies coordinating with their foreign counterparts shields the
United States from meandering down the slippery slope that leads
to authoritarianism. For once a nation surpasses the tipping point,
reversing course may be insurmountable.361

361. See generally Sahar F. Aziz, Bringing Down an Uprising: Egypt’s
Stillborn Revolution, 30 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2014) (examining why the attempt to
remove an authoritarian regime proved to be insurmountable for Egyptians,
notwithstanding years of U.S.-sponsored democracy promotion projects and a
popular uprising).

